Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration and the Future of White Majorities

Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration and the Future of White Majorities



oh good afternoon everyone sorry for the small technical delay but now we are not only here but we're also live on the web thank you all for joining us today for the next edition of our medium seminar the last one before the summer break so thank you all particularly for coming today Madame is the McCarter dialogue and Asylum and migration and the project constitutes a research alliance of steps the Kiel Institute for the world economy and the migration policy center in Florence and is funded by shifting Mikado my name is andreas Backhouse I am a research fellow here at SEPs and a member of the mitten project today we are joined by Professor Eric Hoffman who will present his most recent book wide shift populism immigration and the future of white majorities eric is a professor of politics at Birkbeck University of London a Canadian citizen he was born in Hong Kong and spent eight years of his early life growing up in Tokyo I recalled the PhD from the London School of Economics and prior to white shift he has published two critically acclaimed books the Orange Order a contemporary Northern Irish history as well as shores of religious inherits the earth religion demography and politics in the 21st century was next half an hour Eric will delight us with the presentation of the research and conclusions from white shift so now I will follow up with a short discussion and then we have plenty of time to open the floor for your questions and the broader discussion among all of us Eric you're welcome and the floor is yours okay well Andreas thanks so much for inviting me I'm delighted to be here in Brussels and today so I'm gonna be speaking about my my book white shift which is now many of you are economists and and you're involved in policy so this is a rather larger it's a big book which covers politics sociology demography and I kind of wanted to bring sort of separate discussions together discussions over for example populist right voting attitudes to immigration assimilation and also ethnic segregation residential segregation bring it all together under one rubric and the rubric really here white shift what this refers to this title it means two things besides an agent wanting me to have a one word title the idea is essentially that our politics and societies are being shaped by the decline of white ethnic majorities and now this these groups might refer to themselves by a name such as ethnic swedes in sweden or native Dutch in in the Netherlands so there may be different proper names but essentially what I'm referring to are the largest communities that see themselves as descended from common ancestors and if we think about the global demographic shifts that parts of the world are aging and have below replacement fertility other parts of the world even though the they are moving through the demographic transition still have very young populations and our sin are the source of many many of the migration flows coming to the West and so in this period then of ethnic change how are the white majorities responding because I don't think these demographic changes threaten the nation-state the state the political territorial units there's no threat of warfare there's no cold war going on things that might lead to territorial revisionism invasion that's really not the problem of our century the problem is ethno-cultural shifts brought on by global demographics that are primarily hitting the these ethnic majorities within nation-states so not the political territorial unit but the largest communities of shared ancestry and that have a particular collective memory and consciousness so that's what I'm really going to be talking about is how are these ethnic communities responding to these demographic shifts I talked about four responses in the book fight flee you know taking from fight or flight or to use Albert Hirschman term exit voice so those are two options you can sort of fight the change or you can flee the change through death Nick's segregation what we might think of as white flight or white avoidance or or hung bring down as Robert Putnam talks about in terms of segregated social networks we also have two other responses one of which is what I call repress which is sort of repressing the desire to sort of resist this change in the name of a anti-racist more at morality so this is part of the bigger story of liberal egalitarian ideological shifts that have also taken place since in particularly the 1960s in the West which play into this in a very important way and then finally what I call join so the last response is you join with the new challenge in terms of interracial marriage assimilation so that's the sort of long term part of the book so white shift refers first to that the decline of white ethnic majorities now which is reconfiguring I would argue our politics and making cultural issues more important economic issues less important for structuring politics and then longer-term the meaning of these white majorities is going to shift as populations become increasingly mixed-race and so the meaning of whiteness will change over time but I'm not gonna talk about that I'm happy to talk about it in the Q&A since we have quite a bit of time I'm gonna move fairly quickly through the data and and then I'm happy to unpack this in the question and answer session because we have quite a bit of time so the first question I want to pose to you is well the question many have asked is why do people vote for the populist right one of the explanations is the so-called Left Behind hypothesis that it's people who are economically deprived or who live in communities that are deprived that have forgotten that have been bypassed by globalization so outside of major metropolitan areas and I think the data that I've looked at the large-scale data does not really back up this explanation very well it's not to say there's nothing in it but what we're when we talk about the populist right not the populist left like Ceres our Jeremy Corbyn or Bernie Sanders but the populist right Trump brexit voting for lepen for example AFD this is primarily to do with cultural psychological questions and not material questions so it's not the old material left-right politics it's much more the new politics of what some have called open closed or what David Goodheart calls the somewheres who are rooted in community in the anywheres but even that somewhere anywhere distinction which is essentially trying to divide the population on the basis of people who live within twenty miles of where they were born and those who've moved further away from where they were born and they have different outlooks I think there is something to then for sure but I still think the deeper divide is psychological it gets fundamentally down to how people are wired at that base level and I want to show you some psychological mapping data which I think illustrates this quite well and this is from a firm called cultural dynamics which run they do values mapping they ask about 200 questions which are all mapped out here in two-dimensional space and what they find is that people's answers to these questions tend to cluster and so here's a this is from 2015 and the question is feelings towards the UK Independence Party which was a populist right party in Britain and which question answers correlate best with support for the UK Independence Party this section of the values map which is referred to as the settlers is the main sort of support base for the UK Independence Party and it would be the same map if we looked at France in the frontal or Germany and the AFD whereas this part of the map known as the pioneers are the least are the coolest towards you kept the distinction here really is on values and these deep values are according to some psychologists between a third and a half heritable so they are deeply rooted and they change they don't changing a great deal over the life course and so some people see change as loss and some people see difference as disorder other people see change as opportunity exciting etc this part of the values map with tendency changes lost differences disorder much more so something like attitudes towards capital punishment a discipline of children nationals security nostalgia those are all picking up support for the UK Independence Party whereas something like the Big Five personality trait of openness high openness very low support for the UK Independence Party the point here is that even within say University educated populations you're going to get settlers and within rural working-class populations you're going to get pioneers people who have that more liberal outlook so this is actually something that cuts through these social groupings and is so this kind of a explanatory framework I think is more powerful than looking at class looking at income looking at whether you live in a large city or in the countryside those are I think relatively less important the local really does not explain this phenomenon it's much more of a national individual level phenomenon and local level differences are not that important I would argue and just it by way of illustration if we look at London which is seen as this very place that voted to remain in the European Union versus say the north of England being a leave particularly smaller communities in the north of England actually almost 40 percent of London voted to leave the EU and if we take into account the fact that London is 55 percent non-white British and has a higher share of people with advanced degrees and a higher share of people in their 20s if we strip all that away and we compare say a white working-class London or to a white working-class person anywhere in the rest of England there's no difference in their propensity to vote leaves so that's actually a bit of an illusion to think that there's something about the economy or society of London that makes people remain or actually not really so you have to look I think more at these individual level and also within two-person couple households in in England roughly 27 percent of those two-person couple households had a split on the referendum vote which shows you how individual level this is so it's a very kind of individual level and the orientation is national just to show you what this in a bit more detail this looks at a question which you might not think is related to voting to leave the European Union the death penalty nobody was talking about we want to leave the EU because we want to bring back the death penalty it wasn't something that people were campaigning on and yet what we see is people who agreed strongly with the death penalty had about a point seven seventy percent chance of saying they were going to vote to leave this is just prior to the vote 2016 British elections study internet panel 18,000 samples it's a very large sample by contrast those most against the death penalty only about a point to likelihood of voting to leave so you know fifty point gap between the least and most supportive of the death penalty on the other hand if we look at income levels low medium high there's nothing essentially now I'm not saying there is nothing post the vote as we'll see there is an effect where poorer people were more likely to vote to leave but the economic things like class income matter a lot less than these values death penalty is very much linked to this orientation some psychologists would call authoritarianism which is very much that part of that settler group that you saw in the values map another orientation is what's known as status quo conservatism wanting the present to be like the the past seeing changes loss a question that gets at that would be to say things in my country were better in the past agreement with that also tends to be highly predictive of support for the populace right but even more important than values on this authoritarian dimension or on the status quo conservatism dimension is attitudes to immigration so for example if we look after the vote to leave the European Union the question should more immigrants be allowed into Britain allow many more as a 10 allow essentially zero is is over here what you can see is if you want essentially no immigration your chance of voting leave is is around point eight and if you want many more it's about zero so that's about an 80 point difference now there's almost there very few people down here but still it just shows you how important attitudes to immigration almost as important as attitudes to the European Union so this is incredibly important to explaining the leave vote now by contrast if we look at these income bans yes it's the case that the wealthiest people earning over sixty thousand pounds a year we're a little bit less likely to vote leave that's maybe ten fifteen points at the most compared to 80 points so it's a much smaller part of the story again that's reinforcing this argument that it's identity threat based values based factors and not Material factors that are central to explaining who votes for these parties or or for populist right positions even more extreme example of this is the Trump vote this is from the 2016 American national election survey the question here is what's your preferred immigration level increase it a lot or reduce it to reduce it a lot if you say reduce it a lot amongst white Americans over a eighty percent chance that you'll have voted for Trump if you say increase it a lot it's only about under 0.1 chance so there's a 70 point gap on the immigration question between those who want to increase immigration a lot and those who want to reduce it a lot in terms of voting for Donald Trump whereas if we look at these incumbents there is nothing there at all now I actually think in the American case income and material factors almost don't matter at all where is in the brexit case they do matter but they matter a lot less than these cultural issues around immigration now you might say well the reason people are concerned about immigration is also economic it's not purely a matter of values and culture and I think there's some evidence for that but I think actually if you look at predictors of immigration attitudes the value stuff comes out much much more than in economics and again here we look and we can look at the correlation between are the predicted probabilities based on views of death penalty and attitudes to immigration so if you strongly agree with the death penalty your you essentially are at almost the most restrictive part of the scale on attitudes to immigration if you strongly disagree with the death penalty you're happy with current levels this is a ten point scale so behind the immigration attitudes lies values it's essentially your psychological values on the values map the settler group if you're in the settler group as opposed to the Pioneer group you're far far more likely to vote populist right regardless of income and that sort of those deep authoritarian conservative values then inform your immigration opinion so there's a very strong link from the values to immigration attitudes which then have a very strong link to populist right support now the question we could still we still may want to ask as well if this is the case why is it only now that we're seeing a surge in populist right voting and here I think I would bring in the question of what's been happening to numbers of migrants so even though people get we know that people get the number of migrants in a population wronged by an order of two to three so it's not the case that people are able to accurately assess the proportion of migrants at any given point in time but when he when we look at change over time people's assessments seem to be more linked to numbers and so this is from again Britain where there is a dip so smaller which is a major polling company asks a question what are the most important issues facing the country and we have the numbers saying immigration essentially in in this series this index against that we have the net migration figures which is the essentially a measure of immigration into Britain if we go back to 1984 it's running at sort of between zero and fifty thousand this is this net migration Britain had the lowest immigration in Western Europe for many years not many years but say between 1970 and the mid 1990s starting with the Blair government in 1997 the net migration rises from about 50 thousand up to 150 up to 250 and then under the Cameron can Servat of government up to 330 thousand at the peak as that not migration number is rising we see this a larger share of people saying immigration is the number one issue facing Britain so there's a connection now it there's also a rising number of media stories by the way which is the LexisNexis news story series these series are moving together so we're seeing a rise in migration numbers and a rise in the share of people saying immigrations my most important issue important point here rising migration doesn't make many people shift from saying I want immigration to stay the same – I want it to be reduced so immigration attitudes are not what change they actually change relatively little if at all but within the typically the majority of the population that wants lower numbers instead of immigration being their number five issue after health care and the economy it rises up to be their number one or two issue and that's the big shift the rise in salience within the chunk of the population that already wants lower numbers and and that's connected to migration levels okay so let's look at another example which is arrivals of a regular migrants to the Spanish coast between 2001 and 2014 and again the number of people saying that immigration is a top three concern for Spain again you see this relationship between the numbers arriving and the numbers who say this is a top three concern so there is a relationship between actual numbers and immigration salience right so that's the only relationship I'm trying to establish first we can see this at the eu-wide level as well so this is from the Eurostat figures looking at non EU citizens migrating in and it starts to rise in 2013 and then in 2014 and it hits a peak with a migrant crisis in 2015 before declining again in 2016-17 if we then move over to the Eurobarometer question on the most important issue facing the European Union the same question is asked by the way the most important issue faced in the country we get a very similar pattern the rise begins in 2013 picks up in 2014 to a peak in 2015 and then goes down it's following that the trajectory of the numbers and actually if we think about a sort of natural experiment where we have the 2007 8 economic crisis and we compare that to the 2015 migrant crisis and we say which which of these affected a immigration attitudes but particularly populist right support 2007 8 crisis no consistent effect on populist right support 2015 crisis had a major effect and I think that shows you the difference just in that natural experiment between these two explanations one which is based on economics and material deprivation and the other based on migration it's the migration which has the much stronger effect on the populace right not the populace left but populist right here's another example from a paper by Roland copy on the University College London looking at Germany and the rise of the of polling support for the alternative for Germany or AFD and what occurs is you sorry you have a rise this is monthly refugee arrivals it starts to pick up in 2015 in a serious way to that peak and then declines and what happens is the AFD which was formerly an a euro skeptic party which wasn't focused on immigration gets a change of leadership and frau capetti becomes leader and then what happens according to cop is we have a month on month correlation significant correlation between monthly refugee arrivals and polling increase in polling numbers for the AFD again I say illustrating a similar pattern I would argue that with the rise in numbers you get emigration becoming a more important issue and then with immigration becoming more important issue you get rising support for populist right parties here's a paper that looked at this in in detail across a number of European countries it's James Denison and Andrew Geddes of the European University Institute in Florence and they did a paper that essentially finds that in nine out of ten major EU countries a Western European EU countries the rise in populist rights support is correlated with the salience measure the percent saying immigration is the most important issue facing my country which as we've seen is correlated with actual numbers of migrants so there is this I think a fairly robust case to be made that there that the rise in the populist right is connected then to rise in migration numbers but I don't want to leave you with the impression that in this is all demand-side driven that this is all migration driven there is also political supply factors around media and political elites particularly if we look at the American case I think you can see a mixture of demand side factors around migration but also important quite important supply-side factors and this is essentially asking the question of Americans or sorry of Republican voters in the United States what is the most important issue facing the United States and this is the share saying immigration we have records going back to the early 1930s and for between the early 1930s and the early 1990s the number of people saying immigration is the top issue facing America is precisely 0 for 60 years starting in the early 1990s the issue starts to emerge but at a quite low level then starting in sort of mid 2050 mid 2014 there's a large arrival of tens of thousands of Central American refugee mothers and children to the border at that time we get a spike in the number of Americans saying immigration is the top issue now we've seen a spike in 2006-7 as well but what's unique about this new spike is that the proportion of Republican voters saying immigration is the most important issue remains steady it doesn't drop back down like it previously but it remains solidly at 10% or higher generally through mid 2014 through the Republican primaries when Donald Trump was running and then the election that is unprecedented in since our records begin and that allows a new issue to emerge which Trump was able to capitalize on he was able to he was the only one of 17 primary candidates to make immigration central to his pitch and that was key if we look at the data people who were upset about immigration were the most likely to switch say who might have been Obama voters were the most likely to switch to Trump so immigration was absolutely critical but this graph also shows that demand-side is not the whole story because since late 2017 we've seen a rise in the share of Republicans saying a substantial rise in the share of Republicans saying immigration is the most important issue this is because this is because of a couple of things one is cueing from Donald Trump and the new Republican Party also the right-wing media which up until 2016 really was not concerned with immigration as an issue suddenly became more concerned with it so absolutely supply-side factors do play a role but demand-side factors also do play a role part one of the responses that we see in that I posit that with that we see is this issue of well I certainly have these four responses of ethnic majorities to demographic shifts one is to resist those shifts to sort of fight them another is to actually say well I want to resist those shifts but I would be a bad person if I did because that's kind of a racist thing to do the what's interesting is only part of the population has that response that sort of moral anti-racist moralism response part of the population actually reacts against that and this is the origin I think of the kind of polarization that we're seeing in US politics and to some extent even in in Europe as well what happens with a sort of progressive anti-racist moralism is it helps to keep the lid first on the politics of anti-immigration and populist right support however a problem arises because what this means is that the definition of racism expands to include discussions of immigration levels and in countries such as the United States Germany and Sweden just to take a few examples Britain much less so but in places like Sweden and Germany so in Sweden in 2013 the Interior Minister wanted to have a discussion over migration levels was attacked in the media and by other politicians as racist effectively this shot sort of silenced that discussion but what that means is nobody's having that discussion and that opens up an opportunity a market opportunity for a new political entrepreneur which others is the populist right party an analogy I give is if you are in a communist society and the department store is only supplying one brand of pants then the black market will pop up to supply the other types of pants and in this case there was only one set of policies on immigration levels being supplied by the mainstream parties so somebody else is gonna pop up who's gonna be the political black marketeer which will be a trump or a political or a populist right party to supply what the market is seeking now of course you don't always want as a mainstream party to supply what the market is seeking so I always use the example of George Wallace in 1968 who ran on a segregationist platform and the main parties were correct to isolate him but on an issue such as migration levels I don't think it's has the same implications it's not really about denying civil rights and equality to individuals and so it should have been handled by the main parties well what happens is the populist right moves in has a market opportunity and so for example in Sweden the Sweden Democrats in 2014 come in on twelve and a half percent and reach as high as twenty five percent in the polls which I don't think would have happened if the mainstream parties had got hold of this issue and what's happened since of course is mainstream parties have moved on to that territory to get the voters back from the populist right and we've seen that in in a whole host of places Theresa May and Britain mark Ruta in the Netherlands Sebastien Kurtz in Austria and recently the social debt Kratts in Denmark as well so but then there is a second issue which i think is only present in the United States and that is a sort of direct blowback a direct response to what is seen as a sort of excessive anti-racist moralism as political correctness and Donald Trump was able to effectively weaponize that there been a number of quite interesting experiments one of which this is just an example I've only got five minutes so I'll try and move it along but you know you might take a couple of hundred people in a sample one group reads this paragraph one group reads nothing and we look at the difference in their assessment of Donald Trump the candidate the group that read this paragraph saying we would like your opinion on social norms it's important that we refrain from saying negative things deemed as politically correct to say better to have rules that constrain us from anything that might sound too negative or offensive to members of particular groups people who read that paragraph became significantly more supportive of Donald Trump so in the survey of people the people who didn't see any paragraph Hillary Clinton had a very clear advantage over Trump those who read the paragraph Trump polls almost even with Clinton in the American national elections study next to attitudes towards immigration hostility to political correctness is the second most important predictor white identification is third but so that hostility to political correctness was weaponized very effectively by Trump in the primary so this is covering the primary is when people were saying should I vote for Trump as the Republican leader or Ted Cruz or one of the other John Kasich and one of the other candidates very important because once Trump became leader of the Republican Party he could marshal all of the forces of the Republican Party behind him so this sort of weaponization of political correctness becomes important and so looking sort of stepping back for a second there's two things going on one is that depending on one's own values and psychology in particular immigration is either seen as an negative thing or perhaps a positive thing so you have this different that responds to migration leading to a kind of polarization but then on top of that you have the attitude to whether it's even valid to be talking about immigration or is that immoral and that's sort of second response is typically more liberal voters reacting to the populist voters so it's the populist voters first and then the liberal voters reacting to the populace which is the second layer of polarization around values just to show you how intense this is in the u.s. case if we there is a question that I filled it in 2017 asking do you think it is a racist or be racially self-interested which is not racist right so notice the difference between is defending one's ethnic group interest by wanting less migration racist or is it just racially self-interested which is not is it group as tribalist but not racist and what you see is a very clear cutting of the pie between amongst white American voters so white Democratic voters with postgraduate degrees 91 percent say this is racist white Trump voters without degrees it's only six percent so when absolutely massive and if we just take all white Trump voters sort of just over ten percent all white Clinton voters 70 percent non-white Democrats it's about 60 percent and non-white voters as a whole 45 so non-white voters are kind of in the middle between the white progressives and the white conservatives on this question and what that means then is when we come to the 2016 election and we say okay attitudes to immigration amongst white Republicans versus white Democrats almost no difference from 1992 through to even Romney's that the Romney vs. Obama contest there was maybe a little bit of a difference but once we get to Trump versus Clinton it's 50 points so there's this huge polarization that occurs and that's not just because of populist right voters sort of moving more harshly against immigration due to party switching but it's also more about Clinton and Democrats and progressives becoming more Pro immigration now about 60% of white progressives favor increased immigration in the US so that's actually a response to populism which exacerbates this polarization I won't talk about this but something similar is occurred in Britain there is now a 50-point gap between leave and remain voters on whether immigration should be reduced which is the same sized gap as the gap between white Republicans and Democrats in the u.s. it's the same kind of polarization that we're seeing over these the key issue being immigration because it's the central defining issue for both the demographics but also the value conflict over the legitimacy of politicizing immigration and in particular immigration as is it legitimate to slow it down to protect sort of culture so for example a hundred percent not 99 but 100 percent of a F D voters in Bavaria agreed with the statement Germany is gradually losing its culture and sort of almost a hundred percent 99 percent of Sweden Democrats want immigration reduced so that's kind of giving you a sense of just how important that issue is for the populist right and just looking at the European electoral map I think we can see signs again of this realignment from the left-right economic questions of redistribution versus lower tax and economic growth that old question is being overshadowed by this kind of open be closed or a globalist nationalist or somewhere anywhere whatever you want to phrase it the new cultural politics if we just look at the last twenty nineteen European elections compared to 2014 two groups are expanding their vote populist right-wing nationalists compared to 2014 and greens and liberals also so these the greens and liberal votes you could argue are representing that more open kind of liberal cultural value space and then the conservative sorry the right-wing nationalist and populist is that more conservative ethno-cultural value space or in Britain the surge in the brexit Party and the surge in the Liberal Democrats both of whom I think have this more sort of cultural approach in terms of the kinds of people they're appealing to it's not so much based on class and income it's much more based on values and so that value split is playing a much bigger role in politics okay very I just want to say I've only got a couple minutes okay I'm going to try to be quick on solutions here policy solutions I can expand upon this in your in the QA the first thing I want to say is very important how immigration and national identity is framed by political elites that if you say that the country is changing and immigration is transforming things everything's different diversity is great that message goes down really badly with conservative voters what actually and in fact one of the things we know again people overestimate the share of immigrants ethnic minorities by a factor of two three or more the goal should probably be to try and dampen down some of the wilder claims and so one of the ways I I would suggest doing this is to have a different message for conservative voters from liberal voters liberal voters you can go in with diversity change that's a winner when it comes to conservative voters you want to be talking about how immigration is coming in but as in the past it's simply kind of melting in there's not going to be that much change the nation is gonna be remaining more or less as it always has been it's a bit like if you look at the river yeah it's always new water in the river so it's always changing but at the same time it also remains the same and you want to say to one set of voters things are remaining the same to another set of voters things are always changing you can't if you you have to work with the grain I think of the psychological values of each group so it's a different message for different groups and actually it's not contradictory because you can always say both are true because they are both true they're just different ways of looking at the same picture on immigration again when I favor is an accommodation between liberal and conservative groups that hopefully we can discuss this rationally we should be able to discuss the immigration rates like tax rates we shouldn't be talking about globalist traders versus races xenophobes it shouldn't be moralized in such a way that these groups are pitted against each other in a sort of black and white way rather it's it's not open versus closed it's slower versus faster that's shades of grey so we need to move back to discussing immigration in that more reasonable way about levels and it may be that people favor a lower level then is economically optimal I think that needs to be in a democracy that needs to be accepted if after if migration is low for a while people realize actually there are economic costs to this then that case hopefully will be made and then people can say okay now we would actually like it's okay to have higher numbers again perhaps temporary migration programs or temporary refugee facilities are a way of also approaching this because those sorts of temporary programs don't have the same implications for citizenship and belonging and and because they don't impact citizenship and belonging they're less likely to lead to opposition I would argue last slide absolutely is that similarly when we talk about we need to first of all have a future for ethnic majorities the story that we tell about these declining majorities cannot just be your declining here the bad old past and you're being replaced by wonderful multicultural diversity that that is going to go down very badly with conservative voters the story that I'm sort of more partial to is to say the ethnic majority has a future through interracial marriage and through assimilation a voluntary assimilation it will maintain its memories traditions myths of ancestry etc so it does have a future and I think that's important to reassure conservative voters when it comes to national identity I think there has to be an acceptance that not everyone isn't going to identify the same way to the nation some people want to identify with the lens history even with their many generations ancestry on the land that's okay other people want to identify with multiculturalism diversity that also is okay people have different ways of imagining the nation we know in England for example that ethnic minorities are much less likely to identify with the English landscape and history as part of their Englishness leavers are less likely to identify with England's diverse cultural life let's then remain errs so we need to allow people to have flexibility so it's a menu approach not a hymn sheet approach to national identity not a one-size-fits-all republicanism British values etc this is the nation no it's got to be more flexible than that and politicians should be able to reference both that more conservative sense of nationhood and the more liberal sense depending on the audience if ever challenged on it the response is well there are many ways to be British French etc it's not one way to be British okay I'm gonna just stop there [Applause] thanks a lot Eric before we open the floor just some brief notes from you what you said about the stability of values they received and changing very slowly is actually supported also by research done by our partners in Kiel who have found actually my attitudes towards migration are quite stable across many European countries of course I'm an economist so I promised you before I will not go to met on the empirics and not cite too many economists studies to of course find it's the economy that's driving brexit and populist support and so on like studies by Doron Auto one thing I liked your I think it was very convincing when you said we had the financial crisis we didn't see anti-immigration sentiment go up we saw it only go up in the mass influx of refugees five or seven years later they I would argue about the effect of this financial crisis before did not just evaporate into nothing there was maybe I guess what also is supported by the data is that there's people who identify as white British for example have been on a downward slope economically for quite a while at least in the lower income lower education classes so what you are gonna make arguments are completely out of the window or is it some combination of downward sloping economic relative position plus than a new challenge to identity and also some labor market implications of course of new immigration right right I think you could certainly see in the British case that poorer people were more likely to vote leave so there is some economic effect in Britain I would argue where's I don't see it in the United States I think it's almost zero from what I can see in the US but in terms of the timing in the chronology I'm not I'm not sure that that the austerity argument really doesn't stack up I think for example if we had this kind of migration in an earlier period when you had maybe more robust industrial employment we would have seen the same result and in fact I mean there are historical instances so for example the Irish Catholic migration to the west coast of Scotland in the period from the late 19th century to through the sort of First World War through the Second World War but you can see that there was a big rise in anti-catholic populist parties getting as much as a third of the vote or even if you look in England at the Powell the Enoch Powell period and you you you can see that that that message resonated very well even at a time when we didn't have as much deindustrialization so I think there is this kind of gradual economic restructuring and deindustrialization but I'm not persuaded that it is really telling us very much in terms of populist right support not populist left support but populist right talking about persuasiveness of arguments of politics I liked how you gave some solutions based on the framing that we use in politics which often has much bigger effect I guess and actual policies changing outcomes and you suggested a framing that the parties basically should refrain migration which I think we see they trying to do for example in Germany I see the problem that although I see the problem for the Christian Democrats who have been the majority party in government who they still are they have been in government during basically Merkel open border policies and now they try to rebrand themselves as kind of law and order party who is the only one in Western you're basically standing up for restricted migration which because I just observed it nobody believes really this is a credibility problem that's the parties have difficulties reversing the course correctly and gaining back territory from the populace I think there is a credibility issue that certain parties are more trusted on the immigration issue but I think we have seen sort of mainstream parties successfully take back that at least the voters seem to be willing to give them a chance to do that and I think so in the in the case of Britain first Cameron was given that opportunity when he said he would bring the numbers down into the quote unquote tens of thousands he was completely unable to do that and then so that then again leads to a kind of populist response so they now what we're seeing it'll be interesting in Denmark or but certainly in the Netherlands case it doesn't seem as though the numbers were able they were able to bring the numbers down so I do think voters are willing to give the mainstream parties an opportunity particularly with a new leader how many opportunities it's not clear but if the mainstream parties are not able to reduce numbers as the Cameron government was unable to do then the populist right will come right back in so it has to be both both the way they talk about that the fact that they're talking about the issue but also that they're able politically and in policy terms to reduce the numbers then I think people will transfer their votes away from the populist right yeah I also like the idea of your ex rate refrain from the from the sense from the view of persuasion because of course Texas are I guess suited for this because Texas are boring so it's very non emotional topic contrasted to immigration it's a very emotional topic but isn't that exactly what makes immigration such an active topic in the debate because it's so easy to rise up emotions of voters with that it's so easy to polarize a society for gains which is the play that the populist parties all understand very well so is there any realistic space basically yeah it's that's a tough one I mean I don't think were anywhere near to taking the steam out of this issue I like to see I would like to see politicians moving in that direction to be able to say you know the people who opposed our view on immigration are not either globalist traitors or racist xenophobes they have legitimate arguments we have legitimate arguments we need to make an accommodation I don't see a lot of evidence that people on different sides of this issue are willing to accept the other side and that's I think the problem is that that there's a moralization of this issue into a you know black/white issue that there is you're either with us or against us and I think that sort of framing I think this is just an overall system responsibility to try and get away from black/white to shades of grey and compromise but yeah we're a long way from them would you agree that what you see the black/white only on one side because I would say it's on both sides if you're saying something sensible that would increase immigration then some people will just tell you yeah but you're destroying your aim is to destroy our culture yeah exactly so so this sort of idea that this is just a sort of globalist thing or globalist plot is is the right-wing version of that you know oh they're a bunch it's racist to do this they're both I think ramping up the polarization and the rhetoric and I think people need to accept that you know the the restriction does need to accept that some people like the diversity and change and then the liberal side needs to also accept some people prefer stability continuity less change and I don't see that on either side right now in any serious way in the book you also developed some policy responses and one that you hinted at it's beginning was the framing and how people feel how they see the values valued and represented is very important to them would you argue argue we should focus our policies less on changing maybe economic outcomes which are very difficult to change anyway in the short while more to changing actually feelings yeah I think in terms of Polaris policy responses that political communication side is more important because it's really the cultural psychological that is shaping the attitudes more so I did a an experiment where you know when we talk about you know immigration of immigration in Britain and groups melting in leaving things relatively unchanged and how many politicians like Boer Johnson or Peter Mandelson or Michael Howard have a immigrant background then actually amongst you Kipp voters the support for a kind of a very sort of hard brexit drops substantially and that's I think just reflective of the fact that when you are able to reassure somebody with that more conservative psychology then that's how you're gonna reach them whereas if you talk about more diversity more change being great and but look we're gonna be economically better off actually we find mostly voters are willing to take economic pain actually up to five percent of their income to lower migration and so the economic argument I don't think is gonna cut that much I say will first see for example remain voters who want less immigration if there's an economic cost they're not willing to pay it so they'd rather have higher immigration if it's got an economic benefit but for the leave voter that's not the case last topic I want to touch from our dialogue is you ought to develop some answers to asylum in refugee policies in your book could you briefly elaborate on yeah so I think it's very important to with this question to have a clear line between refuge safety receiving medical health education even perhaps working and permanent settlement and I think the blurring of that line between refuge giving people a safe place to be and getting permanent citizenship or settlement is causing a lot of problems because the so host populations are unwilling to grant settlement to refugees in large numbers and I think we've seen that very clearly in Europe we're seeing it in the u.s. right now but they I think would be more willing to grant so so it would be more willing to pay money for example to have secure facilities for people to flee to that I think that would be more acceptable and also to countries such as Japan and in the in the Middle East that are much more places like Saudi Arabia that are not willing to take any migrants they might be willing more willing to do so if it just meant offering safety and RF huge so I guess I do think it depends what happens I mean if we've got about 60 million refugees in the world and of course we have many people who are claiming refugee status so people from Central America who may have gang problems and may have poverty problems are coming in to the United States I think it's it's different with the Syrians that's it that's more of a genuine refugee issue but the numbers that will come if you have a kind of open policy where you can come in and then melt or disappear and never be deported I think the numbers the potential numbers are extremely large so there has there's going to have to be some kind of a settlement on this issue and I think that line between refuge and permanent settlement should be the line that we maintain in policy okay I think that's a good point now to start or open for discussion if you just drop it would be a microphone please introduce yourself briefly and importantly make sure the microphone is switched on and talk straight into it so that the people on the YouTube can also you thanks thank you very much my name is Mark Benton I work around Europe here in Brussels I have two very brief questions as we as we move towards them ethnically mixed society or societies do you think the the latin-american countries could provide somehow a model for managing the you know this mix these mixed societies I'm thinking of Brazil in particular the Brazil's have always struck me as fairly relaxed about you know my second question is you ruled out at least for the time being a correlation between the issues which you discussed and territorial issues however as again as we move towards ethnically mixed societies could you see a correlation nonetheless arising between you know mixed societies on the one hand and security and foreign policy issues on the other hands interesting I have to ponder that second one but yeah that's latin-american ization of race is something that's been talked about now with increasing diversity in Western countries and I think you right in one sense that we know that say in the in England and Wales one of the things I didn't talk about in the book was the projection is that it's roughly gonna be it's 2 percent mixed-race now 7 percent by 2050 still pretty small 7 percent but then up to 30 percent by the end of the century and then 75 percent 2150 so they and granted that's a long-term projection but demography being the most certain of this of the social science or the most predictable of the social sciences so we are moving in that direction of large-scale mixed-race societies I guess the problem with the latin-american model is the race stratification this is so that the elites tend to be lighter skinned than the poorest people right so you want to avoid that race stratification and I think there are some models you know you can look at you know small groups like the Hawaiians or the American Indians where there is racial variation or for example Central Asians you you have the Turkmen some of them look more East Asian some of the more Caucasian that doesn't seem to structure status within the group so I think that would be but you you know yes mixing but not necessarily the racial stratification that we see in Latin America so I do think these ethnic majorities will become more racially mixed but I think that hopefully they won't have that Latin American stratification second point in terms of territory yeah there may be foreign policy effects if there is not if there isn't large-scale assimilation for example and you do have substantial diaspora communities I mean we know that that diasporas like the Cubans in the US or or the Israel lobby or you have you know the Tamils you have all kinds of groups that then can play a role in their home countries or can lobby the US case let's say and trying to set okay that the course of American policy towards Cuba for example has been affected by the Cuban diaspora and so the question is how assimilated these groups become the more assimilated they are the less affect they're gonna have on foreign policy so one of the questions say would be Muslims overtaking Jews in the u.s. in the 2020s as a share of the total how much will that affect US policy towards Israel I mean I think the issue in the K in the US case is that the Muslim population is multi-ethnic so it doesn't have the same unity as the as the Jewish population on those questions but yeah I think there are all kinds of foreign policy effects it's not clear it'll depend on how assimilated these groups become if they aren't that assimilated if they become large they will have more effect on policy just a note on that Elizabeth Warren just made an interesting turn on that matter because she was known to be pro-israel Democrat and yesterday she made it very anti-israel statement so maybe someone who complained to him updated demographics yeah certainly certainly amongst the Democrats the Jews are still predominantly Democratic in in America but in Britain they're mostly conservative voters but hello Jamie Patel I have a lot to ask actually so I wonder if I could split it up otherwise this could get pretty unwieldy on the first on on the data that you presenters and one of the key things that jumped out at me bringing a British citizen is the way in which you equate especially given the title of a book you equate the immigration into America the refugee crisis into Europe and the immigration into the UK because the immigration into the UK the one that caused that rise and media stories was not different yet there was not any different so do you can you sort of delve into that a little bit more because that kind of undermines a lot of what the rest of you are saying I think also linked to that a lot of the concerns that we're seeing a lot of populous that are being elected in in continental Europe are based in countries where there isn't very much immigration examples being Hungary in Poland where there's not a lot of immigration well at least not from non-european countries so how does that fit in with the models that you're kind of showing up and again I'm just maybe another point in the EU election graph these showed of the the rise of both populist and liberal parties I think just a negative point you keep that you keep vote was taken by the brexit vote so that that rise that it sort of is shown by the that bright blue line I think needs a lot of explaining because it's not I think it shows off a right of a bunch of big of rise then actually it's the case so how do you how do you show how do you how at least three different situations plus the fact that populism is rising in countries where there is no real immigration threat or at least immigration actually SawStop sort of concern it's trying with what you've been saying in your presentation yeah really really good questions so the first thing I mean we have got quite a bit of time here don't we okay so I will try and get into a bit more detail the first thing to say is the British data the Ipsos MORI series the you're right that post 2004 the EU accession countries Poland in particular there was a lot larger numbers than were predicted in that that no question that that plays into the rising profile of immigration but it was only part of the story so the non-eu inflow was higher than the EU inflow all the way from the late 90s to 2016 it's only as we get into 2016 that the EU inflow overtakes the non EU so both of them are important even though I agree with you the way the story is often framed is it's about EU immigration but actually the concern was already pretty substantial pre 2004 and it's both of these things that are I think playing a role and don't forget a pole is ethnically different from a white Britain even though they may look this they are the same in terms of a physical appearance but in terms of language in terms of myths of origin and and consciousness it's it's substantially different so it's they're both an injection of difference let's say so even if you're in Boston you know it's mainly East Europeans but that's still a major difference on your high street and so you know Boston was a major leave voting area the second point I think that you made yes so the central Europe Poland Hungary what's going on in these countries that are ethnically a pretty homogenous limited immigration so the question I think first of all that you can see there's a different dynamic in in East and West so what I'm talking about is the West now in the East what's going on the first thing we can say is that it's the sort of Forex communist countries that are inside the EU that vote for populist right parties not the ex communist part of societies that are outside the EU like Ukraine Serbia etc so why is it the countries inside the EU are not outside the EU and the way this is sort of framed is we if we don't sort of man the barricades we're gonna wind up like them like Germany like Austria etc so it's it's in reference to what's happening in other Western European countries and this is being foisted upon us we're gonna have to become like them and we cherish our ethnic homogeneity the other issue is is to do with the history the historical baggage in these countries around essentially being pushed around by whether it be Soviet Union or Austria austro-hungarian Empire or so this memory of kind of so I think there are some other dynamics in the east you can see it in Germany which is really interesting that voting for the AFD in West Germany is tied very much to immigration immigration numbers voting for the aft in East Germany is is not actually so you you can see the legacy I guess of that Iron Curtain even in AFD voting in Germany I do so I would stick with the premise that in the West this is a sort of immigration related thing now the other point to make however is it's not just the white ethnic majority so there are we have to sort of explain things like the quite significant minority leave vote and the minority Trump vote and there there is a sort of second part to the book where I talk about national identity so this is not identity with a community of ancestry but identity with the territorial political nation-state part of people's national identity is is for some people is the ethnic composition of the nation that they know the country that they know so it can have minorities yes but maybe they are used to the country having a particular mix of groups and so somebody who is say Latino may be used to the United States being white majority with minorities of African Americans Latinos and they may actually be attached to that configuration and so we see immigration is a key concern amongst Latino Trump voters it's a key concern amongst leave voters in the United Kingdom and they're sorry minority leave voters so its minorities who are attached to the country as they know it or as they knew it growing up who are responding to a sudden change in their country's composition so it's not just white voters it's also minority voters who have a particular type of national identity in which the country that they know however that's constituted they see it as changing in a way they don't like I think I answered what was there anything else I yeah this is a second um what surprised me is this idea that we should be trying to cater to these deeply held psychological prejudices you know what instead of trying to address them especially given that a lot of these populist s' votes were gained through lying whether it's a trump campaign or the brexit campaign or the the various statements are made by the Hungarian approach governments what so why should we try and sort of yeah cater to these deviants psychological prejudice when we don't do that with things like say sexism where we say equality is actually important thing you should accept that right yeah you don't want to compromise on any principles around equal treatment or for example hatred about groups so so for example with Trump when he sort of insinuates that Mexicans are rapists or were you know we're gonna shut down all mothers Muslims coming into the America I think he should be absolutely raked over the coals for that so that that's terrible and you know absolutely so I'm not so there are definitely instances plenty of instances where these populist need to be called out for racism for whatever but I think there's a distinction that that is also clear in the literature between hatred of the out-group and attachment to the in-group or attachment a way of life so for example in the American national election study if you take a white American and their attachment to white Americans is not correlated with their coolness towards african-americans or Latinos so a white American who is highly attached to being white is not cooler towards blacks and Hispanics than a white American who is not attached to being white I think we need to sort of have a difference or a distinction between attachment to and dislike of the other so just like of the other no tolerance for it absolutely but attachment to one's own group attachment to one's own way of life that is I think the legitimate thing it's not the same as saying we're not going to grant equality or we're gonna hate or fear an out-group it's it's an attachment like a minority being attached to their ethnicity like an african-american being attached to Harlem as an african-american majority neighborhood it's a similar similar sort of sentiment so we have to I think find a way of respecting conservative attachment to it could it's a similar to attachment to a historic building or a natural landscape or you know so it's it's that set of attachments people don't want those to be changed radically I think that's legitimate what's not legitimate is disparaging or generalizing about an out-group or lying as you say and of course we know that yes there's been plenty of Lies told those have to be called out but I think if we suggest that the only way to be is to want it you must celebrate diversity you must celebrate change I mean you can't make it's like saying you must like Marmite to some people some people just they're not gonna like it and we know I mean this is deeply wired and I just think if you push and push that message you must love diversity and changed for people who don't then action I think we're actually asking for trouble bit better to say okay can we get the people who like change to understand the people who don't like change and vice versa and come to an agreement that's what I would be more in favor of yes I wanted to come back to the central Eastern Europe because I would like to test another hypothesis with you because you say that you are not convinced that migration might be a driving factor for high vote for the for the populist well actually in in both countries you've mentioned Hungary and Poland quite important recently was the playing on the anti-semitism as a vehicle to raise the vote for the extreme right populist in Hungary the campaign anti Soros is clearly on the Semitic campaign while in Poland the the search of the votes for the law and justice in the European elections in the last two weeks were due to the quite virulent campaign against the American Congress resolution of the restoration of property of Jews that were taken first by the Germans then by the by the Polish state after the war so maybe it is worth testing whether in disclosed societies the issue of as you said history and quite violent anti-semitism is to be checked but to contradict myself I would also say that in Poland quite important factor was the the arrival of a lot of Ukrainian workers and we had quite a similar phenomena like in Britain that people were saying we don't want migrants they were saying about Indians but they were thinking about poles while in Poland they are saying we don't want blacks or Arabs but in fact what they think we don't want Ukrainians yeah it's really interesting I mean I think when we want to draw parallels to say the 1930s for example where you know migration was not the issue in in fascism but this idea of scapegoating a minority for particular problems such as losing a war was central so I think that this this issue of history and historical baggage is more important in central Eastern Europe and so I think the some of the analogies with the 30s in fascism I still don't think they work that well but I think they work perhaps better in sort of central Eastern Europe than they do in the West where it's it's a the conditions are very different I still think however though if you look at the the way migration is weaponized by I mean or bond it's really about saying you know we don't I still think there's an effect of we don't want to become like that we don't want you to tell us we must become a multi cultural society like west of it that seems to be part of it's not the only part of the stories I'm certainly not denying you know absolutely that anti-semitism is part of the story in the East which is part of why I'm saying that the dynamics seem to be a little bit different east to west I mean the immigration is not experienced by this central Eastern European countries as much I mean of course the Ukrainians have arrived but certainly the non-european immigration is much more a symbol than it is sort of an actual reality but but again I think that's why the comm unit the dynamics in the communist countries are different I would say but I still think that sort of presence of migration in the West acts as a sort of I mean it's something that the populist leaders are able to sort of riff off of in a way to create the bogeyman of what might come even though it hasn't come yet before we started I just saw a tweet at the whip of the Labour Party I think in the UK I actually quit because of he said he could not agree to rising anti-semitism in the Labor Party anymore so it's not only an Eastern European phenomenon of course to activate anti-semitism in European societies just a quick impression from yours on the UK thing basically what you see happening there how are these parties in particular Labour Party positioning itself yeah I mean I think that on immigration well there's the immigration there's the anti-semitism I mean there's been a lot of talk about anti-semitism in the Labor Party I'm I'm one of these people who's reluctant to to endorse these labels I mean the problem in a way is if you have somebody who's critical of Israel even if strongly critical of Israel I think that should be okay I think doesn't necessarily mean they're anti-semitic but of course you have got elements in the party that have said nasty things about Jews clearly anti-semitic but I still like to believe that that's a very small part of the Labor Party but certainly there have been figures in the Labor Party who say they're not doing enough about anti-semitism I'm really not in a position to judge the extent of these claims but I think a few bad apples should not necessarily taint the the entire party on the immigration well I think Labor's in a difficult position because in a way it's similar to the leave remain conundrum that korban faces that labor needs number the leave voters because many of its constituencies that it needs to win our constituencies that voted leave at the same time most of its voters and certainly most of his activists are remain errs and I think the similar something similar is going on with immigration where Corbyn kind of needed to say something about immigration which was that he didn't want workers coming in and undercutting British wages so he sort of signaled to the more kind of leave oriented restriction Esparta the labor base which is a minority but then the question is if they go very much for an open immigration policy than that could be again this is something that their leave base is not gonna like so I think I think they've got a difficult choice as as do the Conservatives but you know I think this will be an issue once the brexit if it's resolved assuming maybe there's a softer brexit let's say the question then becomes I think immigration will return as an issue right now because everyone's talking about brexit and brexit is fundamentally about the stability economically of the country that's what people are worried about immigration has fallen down as a priority once this issue is sorted if it is sorted if it does get sorted and the economy is kind of safe and everything roars back then I think immigration will become an issue once again in a serious way thank you hi Terry Bestwick from the Quaker Council for European affairs I guess it's a an observation that's so much of the research I mean this is it's clearly written for a white majority audience and that's that I find I just find it interesting that there's less research on ideas about belonging and I don't like the word integration or assimilation but the ideas of belonging attachment affiliation of those coming in and much more of a focus on white on research looking at white majority views it may of course it may include some non-white voters in that but it's not really centered from that perspective it's it's the other way around so that that's just an observation that I find interesting that it's that there's rarely a counter to that and then I think the part about kind of nostalgia and conservatism as yeah as being being an immigrant and being in spaces where this is discussed by other immigrants and second generation in the same in the same boat it's is a fascinating thing that we talk about the complete lack of or very very narrow little part of history that we teach about how the world actually came into being and how it works and where wealth came from and even now how it flows that there is still a supremacist notion of where value is created among which societies and where value is not created which tends to be the blacker and browner parts of the world and given I mean at least in the British historical context that on that lack of understanding of championing the Industrial Revolution knowing everything about it but somehow missing the point about raw materials is fascinating and therefore gives rise to the ability to think about this wonderful history of Britain as being something that was created in a white island as opposed to us which was much part of much part of a bigger kind of global Empire so I wonder if if can we can we actually tell like telling more complete and honest stories of our global histories and current histories in terms of where wealth is created now where it flows from and to in terms of raw materials would help to provide a picture of historic that has been it has to always been a historical mix and exchange and that's what we're all part of whether visibly or not and that currently that is still part of an exchange where value is not only created in certain parts of the world right okay okay so quite a few quite a quite a lot in there um first thing I'd say is that there's plenty in here about minorities I mean it's a 600 page books one of the things I mean I look quite a bit at obviously this is a book about populism so I do look at minority populist voters for example and what and there's been very little done on that the other thing is the literature you know this there's very little literature focusing specifically or explicitly on ethnic majorities so that is you know you can't write about everything and this is this is particularly I think opposite because of the rise of the populist right which is something that there's books about as well in terms of I also talked a lot about minority identity in terms of national identity so I argue that there are different so being British or English let's say one's English identity may vary depending on whether one is ethnically white British or ethnically Africa or be inter-ethnic ly Bangladeshi and one of the things that I'm marketing for in the book is that there are if we think of national identity as a menu rather than a hymn sheet then somebody from say Africa RB in background might identify with different symbols different aspects of British life as part of their national identity and that's fine somebody else who's got multi generations on the land in Cumbria will have a very different maybe they're more attached to landscape etc that's also fine so I do talk about how immigrant groups will identify with the nation and that'll be a different route perhaps then how long settled majorities are identifying to the nation so I would hope that there's plenty in here for non-whites it's certainly not a book marketed at whites and there's a lot on on race mixing and etc in terms of the story of what's told now here I think I would disagree in the sense that I mean many nations in Europe do not did not have colonies I mean Scandinavia for example except for the Danes I don't actually think that colonial enterprises that necessarily that germane to this question of conservatism that that of people being attached to a particular way of life or countries as they know it so there will have to be changed I'm not denying there will be change but it's a question of how fast so it's not yes to change no to change but how fast and also in terms of the question of change in the path there has been there been waves of migrations and invasions in the past in Britain I think however there's also most of the time most of the population of Britain has been native-born so it's it's both are true it yes there were migrations but most of the time most of the population was native born again it's like the river both are true things are always changing they're all you know and there's a story to be told about continuity and sameness so I would like to see you know both of those stories told that's all just jumping in with another question you talked about race mixing assimilation and so on and immigrants kind of blending into the white majority identity which kind of assumes a presupposes that immigrants in a large number and a large do actually want to do this for which the evidence maybe not much research actually on what immigrants actually want in the societies where they immigrate into and how they identify with them so what to do or what is their possible or to do if they just say no this society does not have much to offer to us in terms of identity for reasons which can be completely rational basically for examples as a difficult past with our country of origins so we don't want to associate with this nation yeah that's a very good question so we do have sort of reasonable data on intermarriage rates by group in different countries and so we know for example that in France the Algerian and Moroccan population has a relatively high out marriage rate and in in the United States the Latino and Asian population has a relatively high out marriage rate now this is partly affected by the size of the group so the larger your group if Latinos are now whatever wherever they are 18 percent of the US population it's going to be easier to find another Latino mate inter so intermarriage may go down so it's partly mathematical but on the other hand we have groups such as the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in England that have a very low out marriage rate so it partly depends on which group we're talking about and yes religion and that's not just Muslim but also Hindu and Sikh religion can lead to lower out marriage rates and I guess the question is really how high these out marriage rates are gonna be over generations I think we can see maybe in France the Algerians Moroccans will have a relatively high out marriage melting rate Iranians perhaps in Germany another group but then again yes you're right there some groups have very limited out marriage the question will be longer term I guess which of these factors are is more powerful the demographic shift through migration younger age structures somewhat higher fertility or the decline so that's increasing diversity whereas the intermarriage and assimilation is decreasing the diversity if there isn't you know significant intermarriage assimilation then you're right the diversity levels would continue to rise and I if that's the case all right you know on average again everything else being equal that would tend to produce more support for populist right parties I would argue it's not the only factor there are other factors involved but I still think there are in you know there's enough evidence of reasonably brisk interracial marriage to suggest that you know this assimilation is taking place at different speeds in different countries but you're right there are certain communities that would have a much lower level of this integration because intermarriage would not imply or guarantees that the resulting couple of family is then basically their the values from both societies are split exactly 50/50 or there are some humors coming up it come it can be people coming from a very liberal open multicultural background marrying into a very conservative family for example and they're completely adopting conservative values yes that that's right so I mean one of this in England and Wales we have a census that asks about religion so we can look at who for example if we take Islam and we say who moved from Islam they were Muslim in 2001 – saying they had no religion in 2011 this is predominantly people I mean people who have a mixed ethnic background half Bangladeshi half white British that's the kind of person that tends to move is much more likely to move towards non religion so I do think there's a link between intermarriage and secularization we see that in France as well but but the question the other thing which I sort of mentioned in the book is that you have to imagine a society in which the minority share is much larger and the mixed-race share is vastly larger and the question is how will that mixed-race share identify which strands of their heritage will they choose to identify with in the world of 2050 the the West is going to be much much smaller within the world both economically and demographically I think in that world I think that the sort of pull of the sort of European heritage in different European countries that that sort of connection to the past will tend to draw most members of the mixed group in that direction simply because that will be more distinctive it'll be more it's more established there will always be some who don't and there will be people who are mixed who will stay with the exotic heritage but I I think and we can see this actually over long stretches of time in history so you couldn't look at a place like Turkey where there's all kinds of different DNA in the Turkish population from the Ottoman Empire days from Byzantium and yet it's the identity – the Turkic past which is really a minority of the Turkic deep you know heritage which is where people are choosing to identify so with that's people are we selecting on their aunt's bits of their ancestry to identify with it I'm suggesting that in this mixed-race majority which will be emerging in the next century that they will tend to gravitate more towards the sort of established European heritage rather than towards these various different groups that have married in but I could be wrong but I think the historical pattern would suggest there's always a lot of mixing but there tends to be gravitation towards particular lineages and myths of ancestry my name is Pierre Nora I'm a member of the Royal Society for political economy of Belgium I just wanted to make one or two remarks first of all I'm convinced that origin of people really matters to the white population and it's give you an example if you take the case of the Vietnamese War and the fall of Saigon in 1975 it was followed by quite massive exit exodus of Vietnamese citizens and a lot of people forget that friend the French absorbed about 1 million Vietnamese over a period of two or three years it was it didn't show any opposition of significance from the French population at all and as a matter of fact if you look at the Vietnamese and the Southeast Asian population in Europe nobody ever talks about them because they appear to even if they leave them among themselves they appear to have assimilated into white society or mean just tolerated very very easily so it shows that the origin of people does matter for the white population the second remark I want you to make is that is the following is a lot of people have noticed that Pope Francis as as a doctrine of the Catholic Church concerning immigration and he has spoken out quite loudly about the teachings of the church however if you look back at the history of the church you will see that going back centuries st. Augustine had a policy of immigration and he said that everybody should accept immigrants as a as a human as a human reaction to the arrival of immigrants but at the same time they should not these new immigrants should not disturb society and they should be assimilated into society but they should not change the society and so that is teaching which goes back many many years which shows that immigration and the attitude of the established population really it's a it's a very our story and goes back years and years and the third remark I want you to make and that is more connected to the Belgian situation if you find people who vote populous votes in the right wing in Belgium and you will looked at opinion polls show that immigration plays a very large part in their attitude and the way they vote and one of the reasons is purely economic is that you have a system here in this country where people benefit from rather low pensions although they've contributed their whole lifetime to pension funds run by the state but then they see immigrants arriving and receive handouts from the state as they see it far larger than any thing that they could expect to have during their lifetime and this creates a problem of unfairness in their eyes and I think that the and in the the last Minister for immigration in Belgium was variable is a very controversial figure but when he spoke in public he very often quoted figures which are quite interesting and used the quote figures you said my own father I once went to one of his speeches he said my own father worked all his life as a workman he has 930 euro pension per month and yet I have to sign papers in the ministry granting much higher compensation to immigrants he said obviously says people like the class that my father comes from don't accept that at all the other thing is you have a policy here which is not sufficiently developed for teaching for I would say for the integration of the new arrivals the last time I listened to mr. Franken in fact I went twice to listen to his speeches he said among the the big influx of immigrants into Belgium many Syrians people like that who came because of the war they came into Belgium he said well now this was at the end of last year before he retired for he resigned he said you noted of this mass of immigrants that came into Belgium in night 2015-2016 only 3% now have a paid job and all the rest are supported by the state so when these sort of figures come out don't be surprised if you get people who will vote in the way the populace vote so I just want you to make these remarks to show how difficult the problem is but at the same time it is a question of attachment as you say it's okay if you can find a way to people to attach themselves to the new arrivals it's that's the way to go thank you okay so so quite a few quite a few issues there I mean I think the Vietnamese I wasn't aware it was quite so many in France I'm not sure quite was that high but I agree with you that certain groups seem to have had an easier time of it I mean I I think there was a reasonable amount of resistance to the Vietnamese arrivals in certainly in Canada and Australia there was quite a bit of talk so even though you know it is to some extent perhaps smoother for them than say the Syrians I think I'm not sure it's quite so black and white I mean in so we for example if you look at the case of New Zealand where they voted in a Labour New Zealand first government as a coalition with a populist right party it was predominantly East Asian immigration that was it was the issue even in Vancouver where I it was predominantly East Asian immigration that's people grumbled about it I mean so I'm not sure I mean part of the question no no questions this degree to which a group is different culturally and how quickly they assimilate is is a factor but I mean in the case of the Latinos in the u.s. again they are in some way similar kind of Christians and so on but it's the speed it's the fact that it's illegal in not all cases but in some cases so it's a combination of these things so I so I do think that the yes the economics matters that the cultural distance matters but I don't think it's quite a question of saying that Syrians are in this category and yet amazing this I think it's a continuum it's a shading of how different etc I do think the economics can matter but I think that it's also refracted through the cultural and psychological so the example of pressure on public services you can ask a question of say brexit ears and say how important an issue for you is pressure on public services zero not at all a hundred really important and you get somewhere in the middle sort of forty seven forty eight as soon as you put in immigrants putting pressure to words immigrants putting pressure on public services it goes up to 70 out of 100 which of course if the concern is just about pressure on public services is something you're worried about then the part of that problem that's to do with immigrants has to be smaller than the whole problem so it's very hard to I kind of think that what happens is you form a view on immigration first and that's a lens through which you then see problems like competition for jobs pressure on services I'm not sure the pressure on services the economic side alone is enough to to get us to the populous right voting because and of course these groups are doing I mean I my understanding was in Germany the Syrians we're actually doing reasonably well but I again I don't know the complete data you may know this better on how well different groups are doing but I'm still not convinced that that it's this this this economic factor is what's driving it I don't deny that it's a part of the picture but I think it's it's seeing the economic problems through a lens where you have already made up your mind that your immigration remark on the German case there of course depending on what you read in the english-speaking press it depends very much on the framing I think there was an article in The New York Times and economists saying now everything is great basically employment rate of them is 60% or even higher so everything's perfect praise miracle of course well employment rate might be high but most of these people are very low-skilled jobs and very unstable employment situations jobs it might soon fall prey to autumn ization and offer kind of poor wages and poor conditions so basically these new arrivals ending in the low end of the wage distribution of Germany also making of course very small contributions to the security system because of their low skills low paid jobs so it depends on what you read like definite answer today okay yeah we need good data I think that's the key Bendre number from CC European managers we haven't discussed the role of business or and also how well how they can contribute to a solution or how yeah what the problems are that are to be tackled from from the side of businesses and from managers that would interest me could you elaborate a bit more how you what are you pointing at well so you mean content-wise or particular what kind of problem do you want to see or would you like to see tackled in the populism well a cash is a societal problem right what's the role of large business or I'm I mean the the topic that was mostly discussed here was the role of politics and and and policies of or more broad cultural issues but not how yeah the actual yeah like how business for example if you say how how wages play into that and you you mentioned that the economic variable is not as high as meant or as often framed but how it is still problematic and and yeah okay well why just a few things about business which are interesting I mean generally business historically if we look at immigration history particularly in North America I mean business has generally been in favor of higher levels of immigration because it means lower wages that's sort of a fairly constant theme and that's typically been resisted by these kind of populist pressures that have pushed back on that and so I would expect that that's probably where business is today so but what is there I mean obviously they have a role in integration in terms of and to the extent there's a flexible labor market that people can enter without needing lots of qualifications maybe that's a better way you know it makes integration a little bit easier so the unemployment of immigrants in the english-speaking societies tends to be lower partly because it's easier for them to enter these flexible labor markets there are downsides of flexible labor markets I don't want to minimize those but to the extent businesses can absorb let's say low-skilled immigrants without requiring lots of certification and you know that's probably a positive for integration thank you my name is Mary McGlinn and I'm an American and a Democrat and I really hope that Trump loses the next election however looking at your charts and seeing the toxicity of diversity to the other group of people who don't like change I become scared that he will win when I see you the emcee and your talk about the economy I think maybe there's a chance if the recession comes that Trump will lose its I think both issues of diversity and economics play a part it's just a question of which one will be on top at the time I wonder wait both of you think well you know I think if the if there is a recession that's certainly gonna help the Democrats and also because when the economy when people are worrying about the economy they're not going to be worrying as much about things like immigration and we saw that in the Europe Eurobarometer series that where 2007-8 immigration was a low ranked issue now that's this partly due to the numbers as well but it's also partly due to a displacement effect that when people are worrying about the economy like in Britain then immigration is a lower profile than when the economy is just sailing along then other issues emerge more the diversity question yeah the u.s. is heavily polarized and you know if Biden gets the nomination I would be more hopeful that Trump will lose but I think if one of the other candidates gets it then it's going to mobilize the base more heavily to turnout because and again it's partly about symbols but but this question of what is America and which America is represented is is becoming central I think that the Democrats are not I think they're making an error not Biden but some of the other candidates who are effectively not saying anything about deportation what they're gonna do about the illegal immigration problem I think that's a mistake I think they need to have a line on what they're going to do to control they can't just attack the you know ice ice and and border control and deportation they have to have a line on how they're going to get control of the situations I think if they had that then they would win relatively easily but yeah I think hesitate to go there I think this is where there's a problem because it's seen that you know controlling borders is seen somehow as victimizing minorities that somehow that the meaning of racism again there's been this creep in the meaning the expansion symbolically of that too to include immigration control I think that's I think an improper shift of the meaning of this term which should be reserved for discrimination unequal treatment hatred of the out-group for example so I would just wish there was movement there obviously we know Trump is off the deep end in many of the things he's saying and I wish he would not employ this overheated rhetoric about criminals coming across the border so I think both sides could tone it down but I think yeah if you're hoping for the Democrats I think they need to have some message on the border if I met I mean and I don't think they have any reason to do that running on the hopes of a recession will not be a winning platform my name is Viviana Marte I'd like to know if you believe there is a connection between mobility natives inbound or outbound mobility for education for professional reasons for family reasons I don't know and the attitudes towards immigrants because we know that mobility is a part of the learning process and the more we know the less we fear and I my opinion is that attitude towards immigrants is largely shaped by a fear by the degree of knowledge we have about them so maybe also education can play a part in this thank you very much right right so this we do know that people who move areas are slightly more liberal on immigration the question we don't know is is is it sort of liberal immigration attitudes that are you know causing the moving or or the moving that somehow changes their mind about immigration I'm more partial to that sir first explanation that there's a certain type of person that is more because of these deep psychological values more likely to move more likely to select into higher education most of the reason that you know a large part of the reason that people in higher education who have a degree are more liberal is because people with higher openness one of those big five personality traits are more likely to select into higher education so even at age you know surveys that one survey that was done of people I think age 16 it was at age 15 and you could already see that these people were more liberal and they were more likely to select into university there's some effect of meeting the other you know people who live in a more diverse neighborhood not a more diverse City that has no effect if you have a more diverse local neighborhood that has some effect on your immigration attitudes so there is some effect of this but I think it's quite small I think that I don't think fear is the main driver I mean I just maybe this is where we disagree I think that is more around attachment so for example in the u.s. people who are attached to their and white Americans who are attached to their ancestry tend to be more likely to be attached to being white and more likely to be because of that anti-immigration it's not because they fear the out-group but they're attached to their own group their own way of life so I think it's not the same as fear but I agree with you that plays a role sorry I think that Trump gained thanks to the fear argument I think that is clear there's also a part of this information or lack of information and that's also in the brain or in the brexit case because some of the arguments in favor of the brexit were actually lies yeah I don't absolutely I mean there's no question about it and Trump lies all the time so I'm not denying any of that I'm just saying when we are trying to explain what's motivating people I just don't think those explanations are going to get us very far I mean people whatever information you give them there's going to be what's called motivated reasoning where they have a sort of prior view and they'll filter the information to confirm the prior view so it could be falsehoods it could be true information so I'm just not sure the information effects on their own are really gonna tell us much I think from the scientific angular your coming is more contact hypothesis more we make more contact with immigrants and the attitudes will change I think's evidence for this hypothesis is not really settled yet right broad picture if you think immigration my guest workers has been happening to Germany since in 1950s so you could assume by now basically everyone would have had to be in touch with immigrants so attitude should have linearly improved over time basically stable positive view which has not happened and on both sides I would say immigrant we have seen the data also a simulation of immigrants has actually decreased over generations has actually reverted in many European countries so I don't think it's this linear process is supported too much by no I think yeah it's we've seen a lot of the research on the contact hypothesis has been small group like classroom based so you bring people who are say Protestant and Catholic and Northern Ireland together their attitudes towards each other improved but I think the sense is we don't know what happens when they go away or go back to where their neighborhoods are what we see I think is that the small-scale we do see some effect I would some small effects of the contact hypothesis at the local level but at anything larger than a local neighborhood level you can often get the reverse effect so if you if you are living in a county or municipality that's diverse but you live in a relatively non diverse pocket of that municipality then you're you might even be more threatened so it I agree so threat does play a role I'm not I'm not saying it plays no role but I don't really think this is now in Western Europe anyway maybe in a very homogenous 100 percent homogeneous country then yes the fear of the unknown plays a role but I think once you're into several percent as you mentioned a historic experience with migration I think it's much more about attachment and belonging and sense of loss and the sense that difference is disorder I mean again amongst that part of the pocket not everybody but again it's part of the population feels this way sorry we have two people over there who have not asked the question yet but who want to so I would ask you to you still have a question don't be shy just please be be quick if it's possible then we go to you and then we collect okay I just didn't think I was first well I had a question about your solution it was about framing and you said you you should say nothing will change because people who are conservative will will be maybe okay with super diversity if you say nothing will change but I think that's lying because I think the society should change because it should be less racist to to make it work so what do you think about that well I'm certainly in favor of less racism in terms of less hatred or fear of out-groups or discrimination about groups and I think a lot of the attitudes I'm moving in the right direction on views on intermarriage for example or views of having a boss who's a minority I mean certainly the studies in that I've seen in the US and Britain but I think even in Europe very much confirmed that there has been a these attitudes are improving have improved a lot but I think what I'm talking about is how you frame immigration so one thing we don't hear about is I mean who knew that intermarriage say between Latinos and whites or between white French people and Algerians and Moroccans was quite high nobody knows that so there is already a lot of voluntary assimilation and mixing going on which nobody knows about and I actually think there's a story a positive story that could be told it's not just the case that society is getting more and more diverse it's also becoming less diverse in some ways so second generation maybe doesn't speak the language maybe you're getting more intermarriage so there are ways in which society is becoming less diverse which is also important to talk about and I think to say it's getting more and more diverse you're just gonna get used to it I think that's just not the message already people are overestimating immigrants share Muslims share by a factor of two three four whatever I think the goal should be to try and reduce and dampen down that sense that things are completely changing so I think certainly if you're trying to appeal to I think there is a way to impale to these voters by telling the truth it's not a lie in fact we're not hearing the full truth when we just hear about diversity because actually there's many ways in which society is becoming less diverse and that's not something we're hearing about so I think it is the truth I'm not saying I'm certainly not in favor of lying okay just a short question on the data you feeling thing in the presentation you you mentioned the press coverage and how that sort of course links somewhat to live a level immigration or emigration however it's very differences in terms of say tolerance in terms of mobilizing voters on whether the press coverage is negative or positive yeah I mean most of the studies find that even in what you might think of as liberal outlets like the New York Times that the so coverage on him if there's immigration stories they are you could say they are more negative there are some positive stories but but even there so most of the stories would probably have perhaps a negative aspect to them yeah I did I'm not sure if I've seen studies that have found many some positive you know newspapers that have a very positive message and immigration does that improve you know lead people to be more tolerant I think that would be an interesting study actually but I think it's very hard to you know some people will then go to talk about well if we could just fix the press then world fix our problem but I think that is very tricky in a sort of increasingly fragmented media landscape where the internet is playing a big role now online is playing a big role blogs podcasts etc I think that's very difficult I think the media is gonna do what it does but I think that yeah I mean there will be media effects no doubt about it there's always that question of is the media just reflecting society or is it shaping society and it's a it's a very hard one to answer with research mesh methods although you mentioned that you can look at laying cable into new neighborhoods if that's random then you can maybe say that you can say aha we can show that it's from media to voting or to attitudes because the cable was laid in a random way rather than Fox News being laid in conservative areas it's if it's laid everywhere you can then say okay so they introduced the the cable the media here and look what's happened a study shows Republican turnout in increased so I would like to grant you the last question of the day if it's short sorry the microphone is hi I mean this is what agenda-setting theory is which will tell you that you can't that newspapers don't dictate what people think but they do dictate what people think about and you yourself talked about the relevance of salience and how that does have an impact so you could draw around that circle if you started thinking about a gender setting theory but I wanted to highlight when you talked about segregation and contact is again it's I wasn't saying that your book was written for it well it's written for a white audience in the sense of for example understanding that segregation and people living in very non diverse societies or separating themselves my question is always where did the houses come from that all of the immigrants moved into white flight how did certain areas become segregated in the similar mega gated from others zoning so I think that the point about the importance of having a perspective of what are the policies that have either accidentally incidentally or or kind of proactively created a situation of difference and resentment which goes back to the point about jobs as well it's it's fascinating that no one is attacking businesses for undercutting wages or hiring people of migrant descent or migrant backgrounds but blaming immigrants themselves and I think if you if you had if you had more rounded picture of both what how people see it that okay this is the impact on jobs or this is the impact on housing or that this is the impact on language but you also had the corresponding story of withdrawing services for kind of language support for new immigrants have you had the story of zoning requirements if you had the story of white flight that leads to spaces where immigrant community communities like I mean the most segregated communities are white but that's not seen as segregation so again it's just a way it's not to say that this isn't valid that it's written for right audience and since you haven't taken into account that but it's to say it's a selective look as you said yourself that it's it's not looking trying to address all of it but there are researchers out there study usually most often people of color and therefore probably not that not significant in the pool of wider research but it would be important to complement some of the stories around what the kind of structural responses and policy responses have been with the stories of sociologists historians who are looking at patterns of demography and change from migrant community point of view yeah yeah I mean I guess my quick response I think there's a lot of good points there I mean I actually think minority a lot of minorities are saying we should look precisely at white flight or we should look at the majority we shouldn't just think about ethnicity as something minorities have and I think to that extent I'm actually in line with that I mean I'm looking at at whites as an ethnic group who are defending their own interests so the way you know sociologists have considered minority groups you know as being ethnic and whites are not well I'm saying actually whites are just as much as minorities so I think I am taking that on board and also so for example white flight and and what I say moving White's moving to areas where they are already any large substantial majority I mean I do talk about that quite a bit in the book saying that a large part of the segregation issue in fact an increasing part of the segregation issue is White's moving out of diverse neighborhoods towards less diverse neighborhoods and it's less about minorities self segregation so I think I'm actually speaking to some of the things you're talking about there's a chapter on on residential movements in the book but but I agree with you I think the big the minorities are moving out of their areas of concentration increasingly into these super diverse areas so but what's occurring is that the white population is selecting towards more heavily white area so I agree with you in fact the segregation picture going forward is going to be Blee more determined by white mobility so yeah I agree with you there okay thanks we're at by the end of the long seminar which you have enriched greatly by your use and knowledge in this discussion thank you very much for staying around thank you very much Eric and for coming and addressing all these points I hope you also enjoyed being with us today and we all hope to see you next time in our medium seminar series thank you [Applause]

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