Great Explorations at UTSC with guest speaker Chris Cochrane

Great Explorations at UTSC with guest speaker Chris Cochrane


>>Good morning, friends, staff, students, and colleagues. It’s nice to see you here again. I met some of you at the launch of this series. My name is Maydianne Andrade. I’m the Vice Dean Faculty Affairs and Equity and a professor in biology here at UTSC. I bring you welcome and greetings from the office of the Vice Principal and Dean. The Dean really is very invested and enjoys the series, but he is in Turkey at the moment. So I am doing the introduction. This Spring Speaker Series, Great Exploration, will come to a conclusion with today ‘s talk, but we’re happy to confirm that we do have dates for the fall. There’s some flyers out in the foyer, and we do hope to see then. Great, I’m glad you enjoyed it. So those dates are in October, and the topics and the speaker will be confirmed over the coming months, today, we have the privilege of a talk and a discussion led by Professor Chris Cochran. Professor Cochran is an Associate Professor of Political Science here at UTSC, associate chair of that department, and also a member of the School of Public Policy of Governance at U of T. He joined the faculty of University of Toronto Scarborough in 2010, after completing a master process at McGill and a PhD here at U of T. His main scholarly focus is on the ideology and political disagreement in Canada and other democratic countries. He is the author of the book, Left and Right, The Small World of Political Ideas, and this book, published in 2015, together with a number of his papers, all published in influential journals in the discipline, make clear the hallmarks of his work, which are the search for understanding the ideological fractures in the political system. He’s no stranger to controversy, and how these are related to society in which they’re formed, and exciting just for me to see the overlaps with my interest in biology, the use of data mining and computational techniques to make accessible the rich documentation in the parliamentary and other government processes. So you got the written word, and then ways of extracting data from the written word to support and make new arguments about the causation and the patterns, at a broad level, of these ideological divisions. Professor Cochran is the lead investigator of the Hansard 150 Program Project. So the Hansard, then, is the complete written record of parliamentary debates over the last 150 years, and with funding he received from the U of T Canada’s assess Sesquicentennial Fund, he will be using digital tools to extract data from that record, so we should see and hear some new things about the history of Canada, as represented in that record. He’s also the lead, and has been since its inception, of the Linked Parliamentary Data Project, which uses a similar approach, but in a comparative way, to look at what parliamentary speeches in Canada, the UK, and the Netherlands have to tell us about the ideology and political process. And for that, he’s now just received his second grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, very challenging grants to get. Professor Cochran is also a gifted teacher. He was honoured in 2013 as Professor of The Year by UTSC Underground, the student-led paper, an award for Outstanding Excellence in Teaching and Dedication to Imparting Knowledge. He was a 2016 recipient of the UTSC Faculty Teaching Award, it is also, in addition to his research, made a stamp on political understanding and Canada by being co-author, and then the primary author of Canadian Politics Critical Approaches, a textbook that’s very widely used in Canada that talks both about the context and the ideological impacts of political discourse. So it’s this ability of his to capture, explain, and contextualize polarizing political debates. That has also led to his regular appearance in the media. You may especially, during the American election and during our own election, have seen his face and heard his voice frequently. In fact, Dean Goff tells me that whenever someone from UTSC, a faculty member, has an appearance in the media, he reads the story. He reads the background, and then he contacts them, but in the case of Chris, he had to stop doing that, because he felt like he was pestering him almost on a daily basis. So his ability to do these things and to talk about it to a wide audience is the subject of today ‘s lecture, as well. The growing left-right political divide in Canada and the US is his topic, and please join me in welcoming Professor Chris Cochran. [ Applause ]>>Thank you, Maydianne, for a very nice introduction. I guess I can say two things at the outset. One of the projects, we’re not going to talk too much about that today, but one of the projects that I’m involved in, as Maydianne mentioned, is looking at, trying to find ways to teach computers to read Hansard. And we calculated given the number of words and the average rate of reading that if you read Hansard at a rate of a novel’s worth of reading each day, you could get through the English part in 67 years. That was about the estimate. So it’s something, obviously, that’s much better suited to computers, if we could find a way to teach them how to read and extract meaningful content from it. In terms of media appearances and other things, you know, there’s a tendency among political scientists and others who are really interested in politics to wish that a lot of other people were excited about politics and constantly engaged in politics, and I think that it’s important, given that it’s necessary, but I always do wish that, to some degree, we can live in a society where we it was a little bit less necessary than it is today. And you know, you see a lot of political awareness now, and I think a lot of it comes from a position of sort of anxiety rather than, you know, the comfortable 90s, or at least the more comfortable 90s. So what I want to try to do a little bit today is talk about one of the main lines of political disagreement, which is the left-right political divide, and I’ll do my best to explain what that is, with the acknowledgement that it’s more difficult than it looks like, I’ll talk about some of the evidence about what comes from, what might be some of the factors that are behind the left-right political divide, and a look at the pattern of the United States, especially, I think that’s the one most of us are probably most familiar with, given the last election, the fiasco, you could say, of the last election, but I’ll also talk about it in Canada, as well. Such to say, the main finding here will be, as you’ll see, that there’s no question that the left-right divide is increasing, that the intensity of the divide is increasing in Canada, it’s increasing in the United States, as well, but there’s also a lot of evidence that many other countries, too. So when we look for explanations for it, it almost certainly can’t be something peculiar to the United States and peculiar to Canada, given how widely it seems to be applied here. So let me start with a basic question that I find there’s two types of people struggle to answer. So what is the left-right divide? When we go out into a survey setting, or if you’re asking people, just regular folks, that will respond to a survey, what do you mean by left-right? When we think left-right politics, what do you think we mean by that, or what do you mean by that? A couple of things stand out. So the first is, a lot of people often get categories sort of mixed of. They reverse them, right? So they might put, for example, you know, we would normally think of the NDP in Canada, the Democratic Party being on the left, the conservatives being on the right, a lot of people just reverse them, a few people have never heard of the terms, but a very small number of people, and most people can actually classify the parties and left right space. Now it’s interesting about that is even the people who reverse the parties tend to get the order of the parties in the right direction, right? So, if they think, for example, that the NDP is the most right-wing party, they know the liberals are in the middle, and think the conservatives are the most left-wing party. So I think, sometimes, there’s a lack of understanding about the vocabulary, but an understanding of the concept of what we’re actually talking about when we try to position political parties and people left-right, and left right terms, so sometimes, people don’t pay attention to politics regularly struggle to define or think about left/right. The other group of people that struggle to define left/right are people that look at it really closely, and you know, left/right, the more you look at it, the less you seem to actually understand what it is, so most people who are involved in politics, politicians, political activists, people who study politics would be able to give you an answer for left/right, but when people actually really start to look at the left-right divide, they find that they can’t define it in as clear way as they might have imagined. So the more you study it, the less easy it becomes to actually say what it is. And this presents a bit of a challenge for me, because I’ve been studying it for a while, and I have to admit, I can actually tell you what the left-right divide is. I can’t give you a concrete definition for it, but I do know it when I see it. And I can show it to you, all right? So I can show you what it looks like, but I can’t define it. And this idea, actually, that, you know, of knowing something when you see it, and of being able to even show it in an image, but not been able to say precisely what it is is not uncommon, and it’s not confined to left-right politics by any stretch. In fact, one of the sort of canonical examples of this phenomenon is a United States court case about the definition of hard-core pornography, so the question is how do you distinguish heart-core pornography from art? And a judge was asked to make a ruling about whether or not a particular image was hard-core pornography, rather than art, and the effort there for the judge is, a challenge was to try to find a way to define what you actually mean by hard-core pornography in such a way that is distinguished from other forms of artistic expression. And the judge, Potter Stewart, in this case famously said, “I can’t tell you what it is (hard-core pornography), but I know it when I see it, and this is not that.” Right? So this phenomena is, and there’s many other examples of this, but this phenomena is quite common and quite widespread. Psychologists have looked at it, philosophers have looked at it, and it stems, I argue, of this notion of a family resemblance. That sometimes when you have a category or a word that’s designed to describe something from a particular category, you can say that this category is defined by some characteristic that all things within that category share, right? So kind to give you sort of a bit of a bizarre example, but you might have, you know, a collection of objects, and you might create a category for red objects, and all of the things in the category red objects of red, and so you define the category in terms of that one property that all of the objects within the category have. The problem is, in ordinary language, and we talk about things, and we come up with words like left, right to describe patterns of political disagreement, the problem is that things now cease to have one thing necessarily that separates them into different categories, and they might act more like a family resemblance. And this is an idea from a very influential philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and the idea here is that now, all of a sudden, each thing that you were trying to categorize has multiple characteristics, and categories of similarity can be defined by the overlap bring and crisscrossing connections between all of the different characteristics, so for example, if you think of a family resemblance, what are the properties of a family resemblance? Well, first of all, not everybody in the family resemblance needs to share the same nose, for example. You might recognize a family resemblance, and you see that a number of people in the family resemblance to share a similar kind of knows, but maybe others share the same eyes or the same for head, or some other feature of their face. Maybe it’s the hair colour. Maybe it’s the teeth, but it’s no one characteristic, because if you were to say this family resemblance is defined by similarity in terms nose structure, well, then you move across all of the people and family, and you find that not all of them have that particular no structure. And if you were to say it’s eye colour, you would go across the family, and you find that they don’t have the same eye colour either, or whatever. So characteristic after characteristic, you move through and you find that no one characteristic defines the resemblance, is it’s these sort of overlapping/crisscrossing connections between the totality of characteristics that defines a resemblance. This is the Kennedy family, for those of you who may not be aware of that, and this is, in my view, an example of this phenomenon. So left-right operates like a family resemblance. There’s no one thing that puts all political parties on the left, no one thing that puts all the political parties on the right. It’s these overlapping/crisscrossing connections between parties and people that defines their clustering, in my view. Now one of the ways we actually can look at this, and this is a very impressive project. It’s a comparative manifesto research project, and it was an effort to try to quantify the meaning of every single political party election platform in every democratic country since the Second World War. So they collected all of the — as much evidence as they could get about what kinds of messages parties were promoting in election platforms, and then, I was going to send forced, but paid people to sit down and read through, sentence by sentence, and classify each sentence into one of 57 different policy categories. So you would read a sentence, and you would say, you know, this sentence supports the free market, for example. So, you know, well, add one sentence is support for the free market. And maybe one other sentence is opposition to the free market, and there’s attitudes about multiculturalism and so on and so forth. And here’s an example of just a few of the different coding categories they had. So, you know, anti-imperialism was a category. Support for the military. So if the sentence supported the military, you would say that this is a support the military sentence. Opposition to the military, passivism, constitutionalism, democracy, and so on. There’s all kinds of different categories, and these are the descriptions that they use, and each political party ‘s election platform in each election is then scored on each of these items as the percentage of sentences in the platform devoted to each of these issues, so if 10% of your platform is devoted to as support for the free market, you would get a score of 10 on support for the free market. So this is the manifesto project, and really quite an impressive project. So again, there’s 21 Western democratic countries that they’ve coded and dated for, all the way back to at least 1945, and in some cases, even earlier. So one of the questions that I was interesting and thinking of it in left-right terms is, you know what? What happens if we just take all of these political parties, right? We don’t worry about what country they’re from. We don’t worry about what period of history they’re from, and we classify them in terms the extent to which they share certain kinds of policy positions, and it doesn’t matter what those policy positions are, so the more similar political parties are to each other across these 57 different policy categories, the more closely they sort of come together, you can imagine, right, in terms of their similarity. And the less the more they are in terms of these 57 categories, the more they push apart. So that was the first part. We were interested in seeing what would happen if we did that. The second aspect of it that we were interested in was to think about not just in terms of characteristics that parties share themselves, but also to think of it in terms of which political parties are these parties both similar to? So you can imagine this being like a, you know, we do actually use the data from a lot of social network analysis. We use the tools of social network analysis. So you can imagine now that you’re not just measuring two people, in terms of whether they’re directly similar to each other, but you’re asking are these two people directly similar to the same group of other people? Which really is, when you think of it, how a family resemblance can operate. So it’s like friends. You may know somebody and have a direct personal connection to them, and that makes you close. Alternatively, you may not have met somebody, but you may both be friends with the same other group of friends. In some cases, enemies with the same other group of enemies or opponents with the same other group of opponents, and that also is a connection. So really it was just to throw the data, as we had it, into a method that would allow us to account for indirect similarities, really, and this is the sort of visual, the graphic that emerges from it. I’ll describe the colouring, I guess, in some detail, I hope you can see it okay. But the colouring is designed to capture different kinds of party families, and these aren’t how we coded them. These were, you know, green, for example captures green parties, so environmentalists’ parties and others. The teal points capture socialist parties, so these are parties that are committed to sort of different forms of economic arrangement and socialists. The purple/pink are social democratic parties. Yellow are Christian democratic parties. The blue are conservative parties. Black are far right national parties. Red are liberal parties, you sort of can’t really see them that well clustered. They’re there in the middle. They’re there, and there’s also regionalists parties, as well. And you know, one of the interesting things about this sort of this method is what we actually found was just throwing it all together, we actually found that green parties, which really don’t emerge until the 1990s or later, I end up alongside socialist parties, they end up nearer to social-democratic parties, further away, liberal parties are a bit hard to see here, but they’re all here, along with Christian democratic parties and conservative parties are off here. So just throwing all the data together and looking at it an analysis, we do get something that we might consider to be a left-right divide in politics. Parties that were decades apart historically and of clustering together in this analysis. They’re more close to each other if they’re on the left, and parties that are, in some cases, decades apart, countries apart, and up clustering more closely together if they’re on the right. And in fact, when we look at the different issues that define the issues of the parties in that network graph, what we actually find is that the parties which are on the left side are delineated by things like social justice, right? So this was a very strong factor common to parties that ended up clustering on the left, and social justice here is a commitment to equality, equal treatment of people, equal treatment of economic classes, greater redistribution of wealth, and so on. You see support for the welfare state. You see environmentalism. You see internationalism, pacifism, support for a more sort of controlled economy. You see support for labour recruits, you see opposition to militarism, and so on. So these are all things that we would normally associate with people and political actors on the left, when we think of the right, we see, really and crucially, support for free enterprise as being a defining characteristic of parties on the right. We see economic orthodoxy, which is defined as supporting the banking industry and support for growth, and so on. We see support for the military, support for greater economic incentives. So, the idea if you incentivize people economically, they’ll work hard. Traditional morality, opposition to welfare states, support for patriotism. Law and order is a bit peripheral, though I’m going to talk about this in the second, and again, these are all things that, I think, intuitively, we would associate with political parties and actors on the right. So there is some, it seems to me, face validity for the argument that what we are capturing, if we look at these patterns of agreement and disagreement between political parties, is the substantive content that we all describe when we use the term left and right. So even though not all right-wing parties are supportive of free enterprise, not all left-wing parties are supportive of social justice, a lot of them are. It’s a very important characteristic in the family resemblances that define these two categories. So that’s the broad historical picture. When we break it down by decade, things actually look, in my view, even more interesting. So, if you look, for example, at what were the kinds of issues that distinguished the left from the right in the 1960s, and in this graph, the colours, we don’t really need to get into too much, but in this graph, the position of the points, lower points indicate more left-wing positions or positions that were more common among left-wing parties, and I’ll read them out if the visual is not big enough. The upper parts of the graphic indicate sort positions that are more common among right-wing parties, and the size of the bubbles is the frequency with which they appeared in political party election platforms. So larger bubbles appeared more commonly in political party election platforms. Smaller bubbles appeared less commonly, less frequently in political party election platforms. So what this says, at the very, sort of the most left issues are anti-militarism and support for peace. This is the 1960s right? They’re not discussed a lot by political parties. Pacifism and antimilitarism weren’t commonly mentioned in political party manifestoes, but when they were, they were almost always mentioned by left-wing parties and never by right-wing parties, that’s why they end up at the bottom. Social justice, so support for equality, democracy, and labour are left-wing issues that are discussed quite a bit by left-wing parties in the 60s. Support for the welfare state was a big issue for left-wing parties in the 60s. Alternatively, for parties on the right, economic orthodoxy, free-market. No one really opposes the welfare state. It’s not a popular thing to run on, but whenever that happened, it ended up being a right-wing party. You can see traditional morality and militarism were also items, but really not that big. If you were to define that a right, sort of kind right issues would be support for greater productivity, infrastructure, and incentives. Right? So this is what the 60s look like, according to these data. As you move into the 70s, we can see a couple of changes that are worth mentioning. I want to draw your attention to one. That is that social justice now becomes a very strong anchor for the left, and not only is very much a left-wing issue, and that parties that talk about it are almost always on the left, but it’s also something that now starts to define a greater number of the manifestos of political parties, more frequently talked about. For the right, we can see a little bit more coherence, free-market, economic orthodoxy. Support for those things are really strong on the right. Efficiency, traditional morality also start to become a bit stronger, as does support for the military. So this is what the 70s look like, now notice the environment, people start talking about the environment in the 70s, it starts to appear in political party platforms, but it’s not something that the left talked about more than the right, or vice versa. It was something that was equally likely to be discussed by right-wing parties as by left-wing parties in the 70s. In the 80s, things change a little bit, we can see a greater clustering here on the right. We see law and order reemerging. So I’ll flag that. You can also see that environmentalism is now, support for the environment is becoming a bigger item, and also, something more common among left parties than right parties. So it’s moving down a bit in the graph, support for democracy, social justice, and pacifism are also important. Here’s the 90s. Environment is now signature thing, the signature policy item in left-wing political party election platforms, alongside social justice. Greater clustering here on the right, but really, the profound emergence of environmentalism is a signature left-wing item, I think is of some interest, and here’s what we see in the 2000s. Environment and social justice are pretty much defining features of the left-wing family resemblance. Welfare state is also sort of left, but right-wing parties also sometimes talk about that, and you can see here the role of law and order, the reemergence of law and order as a right-wing item. That has subsided quite considerably in the post-war era, we also see, again, support for the free market economic orthodoxy and efficiency as being characteristics defined on the right. So this is where the evolution, I guess, the ideological landscape of left and right. This is the positioning of all of the political parties on a left-right scale. If you take out all of these sort of items and you create a scale of, you know, parties that have more of the most left-wing items end up being more left-wing, and parties that have more of the most right-wing items end up being more right-wing. You take it out, and you plot it on a histogram, this is the distribution that you see when you plot them all. So you can see, there are fewer parties that are really far off to the left, fewer parties really far off to the right. A lot of parties are sort of centre-right. A lot of parties are sort of centre-left, and again, the colouring of the bars is different party families, which I think is intuitive for those of us who sort of follow politics regularly. Green parties and socialist parties, which are the green and teal, end up concentrated over here to the left. Conservative parties, populist nationalist parties in blue and black are concentrated over here to write. So again, I think there’s some face validity there to the measure. One thing I do want to mention, and it’s a little clearer in black and white, is that there are actually not that many clinical parties in the centre of the political spectrum, the centre of the left-right divide. Most political parties are somewhat off to the left or somewhat off to the right, and I should add to that that there are two things about political parties in the centre. The first is that there aren’t very many political parties in the dead centre of the left-right spectrum, and the second thing is that when political parties do go to the centre of the left-right spectrum, they had to fail. They tend not to succeed, so they tend to be small. Now this is peculiar for those of us who might be most familiar with Canadian politics, because we think of the Liberal Party is the central party, the centre party, and also the dominant party, but Canada is the only country that’s like that, and the reason for that, probably, as we’ll see in second, have nothing to do with the liberal’s position, or little to do with the liberal position as a centrist party. So there are some advantages of being in the centre, but as we shall see, I think those advantages are often overblown, so this is a bit of a mystery, for those of us who study left-right politics, and political science in general, because we would have expected the best position of political parties to be the centre of the left-right divide. I mean, that was sort of the conventional knowledge, if you appeal to the centrist voter, that’s how you win elections. It’s great in theory, right? It works perfectly in theory appeared it just doesn’t work at all in practice, and there’s really no evidence that this theory works for the real world. Now the reason it’s a bit of a mystery is because when we ask people to position themselves on the left-right scale, we say, okay, you know, some people talk about politics and left-right terms. Here’s a scale that runs from 0 on the left to 10 on the right. Where would you position yourself? Country after country after country, most people, or I should say a plurality of people, identify with centre, the dead centre of the political spectrum, and fewer and fewer people identify with either extreme, so you can see here in Canada, most Canadians say they’re in the centre. Right? Plurality, anyways, say they’re in the centre. Some are centre left. Some are centre-right. Very few are far left. Very few are far right. Country after country, we see the same thing. United States is a little bit different. The United has a rightward skew. So more Americans identify as the right than the left, but I would say here that the language of left and right is least common in the United States. They use the terms liberal and conservative instead. We, obviously, can’t use them here, because they correspond with party labels. So as possible, in fact likely, that a lot of Americans of left and right, and they say, well, you know, politically, I’m right, right? Because they think of right in a literal sense, not a directional sense, and that explains the American distribution, at least, and many others would mention that. But in virtually every country, the centre seems to be the place you want to be, right? So if you’re a political party, and the idea is that, you know, political parties that are closest to where most motors are positioned should win the election, then presumably, you would want to go to the centre of the political spectrum, right? If you were to set up or advise a party. So why don’t parties do that? Well, here’s my answer to what parties don’t do that, this is a bit of a, you know, a complicated graph. So I’ll summarize it in general, but I want to lead you through it, as well. So when we surveyed people, country after country, and all of these sort of democratic countries after each election, we asked them all kinds of questions like where they position themselves in the left-right space, where the ink of the political parties, and so on. One of the questions that we asked them is how you feel about different political parties? All right, on a scale of 0, meaning you really hate them and 100 mean you really love them, how you feel about all of these political parties? And what this graph captures is the average answers of people in all countries to that question, the feeling thermometer question. For those who identify here for the far left, who self-identify and say I’m on the far left of politics, my left-right position is far left, and this is the feeling thermometer. So I’ve standardized it to 0 means you really hate them. Ten means you really loves them. So parties that are placed lower, it means that people on the far left really hate them. Parties that are positioned at higher positions means people on the far left really love them. So that’s what the height indicates. And the axis across the horizon, the x axis, is the left-right position of the parties themselves. So parties that are closer to the side are left parties. Parties that are over here are right parties. So all this graph is showing us is that people who self-identify and say I’m on the far left, on average, really like political parties that are on the far left and really hate political parties that are on the far right. That, in my view, is not a mystery. I think we would have expected to see that, right? And when we ask people who identify on the far right how they feel, we see just exactly the opposite, right? People who self-identify on the far right, so at 10 on the left-right scale, they hate political parties that are on the far left, and they love political parties that are on the far right. So again, there’s nothing, you know, counterintuitive about that finding. It’s what we would have expected. And as we fill in, we look at, you know, sort of the moderate left, right? People who are little bit less left-wing, we see the same pattern. It’s just that people who are on the centre-left, for example, love left-wing parties a little bit less and hate right-wing parties a little bit less. Right? That’s what seems to define, or least be typical of people who are on the centre-left. The same thing, again, for those who identify on the right, people who are on the centre-right, they like right-wing parties little bit more, but they don’t love them. They dislike left-wing parties a little bit more, but they don’t hate them, right? So there’s nothing unusual about that. Here’s what I think the interesting thing. We people who identify in the centre, what you find? And it is not the case, or I should say, not very much the case, and arguably, not at all the case, that people in the centre prefer centre parties. All right? People in the centre are indifferent, between left parties, centre parties, and right parties. So when we think of the distribution, when you hear, for example, that most people are in the centre, well, why don’t centre parties benefit there? And it’s because the centre is not a position in the same sense as left to right. So in left-right politics, it seems that political parties are drawn to the left and drawn to the right, because people on the left and the right do care, and people in the centre, for the most part, or I should say, on average, do not, right? So there’s no benefit. There’s no greater likelihood that folks in the centre will vote for parties in the centre. I think that’s a bit of an explanation for why, given that everybody thinks they’re in the centre, political parties that go there don’t when, and so few parties actually end up going to the political centre outside of Canada. So we’ll see. So where does left-right come from? I mean, we see that it’s characterized the politics of democratic countries, at least since the Second World War, and some trace its roots all the way back to the sort of the end of the Napoleonic era in France, even before that, actually, to the early days of the French Revolution. But it seems that wherever democratic politics goes, the left-right divide seems to go with it. So we might ask ourselves, you know, where does left-right come from? I can tell you just a couple of things about sort of what researchers have found about the origins of left-right. The first is that the left-right divide is intuitive, right? It’s not something that people sort of think about and, you know, come up with their own for a position. They think really hard about what evidence and data and all this other stuff, and they say, oh, you know what? Having considered everything, it seems to me that the left is the best position, or the right is the best position. The evidence suggests that’s not how people think about politics. There’s an intuitive aspect. People, as we’ll see, are drawn to, sort of, left-right politics almost as an initial sort of this kind of resonates with me the most, and then they get involved, and they find all kinds of arguments to support the position that they’ve already adopted. I’ll show you some evidence for this. And then they can argue until they’re blue in the face, but the bottom line is, put two incredibly intelligent people in a room together who know all the ends and outs of the economy or politics or whatever. Have them argue with each other until they’re blue in the face. They will leave with the same opinions they went and with, right? And you see this, you know, constantly, right? So it’s interesting thing. You’ve probably not had the experience of convincing some other highly sophisticated person, oh, you know what? You’re right. I am going to abandon the left and go on to the right, or whatever. And so we’ll look at that. The second, this is a bit more controversial. You know, maybe people who study the stuff, you know, inside-out, and this is their main field. They can dissuade me from this idea, but given the evidence, I just can’t see the argument against the notion that to some degree, our left-right politics, there is an innate element to it. So there’s something we’re born with that seems to make people more drawn to left positions, more drawn to right positions. It’s context-dependant. I’ll show you the evidence for it. Maybe we can think it through. I’ll show the evidence in some detail. We don’t have to go through the evidence in some detail. There’s also, quite obviously, a social element, right? There’s many different social aspects to the left-right divide. People pick it up, in some sense, by virtue of who they’re associating with or what their social context looks like, and I’ll show you evidence, really, for each of these components. So what’s the evidence for intuition? A very influential book, it’s really the summary of the Nobel Prize-winning research agenda of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, but Tversky died before they got the Nobel. So he didn’t get the Nobel, but it’s very much implicated in the research agenda. Some of you may have read this book. It was a New York Times bestseller. The book is Thinking Fast and Slow, and it’s by Daniel Kahneman, summary of all of their sort of research over many decades. The basic argument of the book, he uses what’s called a sort of dual-processing model of cognition. And the basic argument of the book is that there’s two elements of cognition. One is a kind of a lazy but very quick, intuitive aspect of cognition, where we just kind of go through the world. We see something. We witness something. We have an immediate reaction to it, it before we had a chance to think about it, right? And that’s an intuitive aspect, an intuitive reaction that we have. And then there’s the second part of our brain that we can use, which is a rational part, where we really think something through, or think about something. That we’re doing a math equation or something like that, right? We’re not using our intuition there, or we shouldn’t be. We’re probably specifying it rationally and trying to come up with a really formal way of understanding it. And a great example, actually, of this phenomenon, I love this one. I mean, this works perfectly. As in perfectly, in a class of 200 people, you might get four that it doesn’t work on. And it goes something like this. You ask a group of people, imagine that you’re planning a wedding, and you have to arrange, you know, 25 tables, and on each table, you have to buy a centerpiece. Each centerpiece costs $17. How much money do you need to buy all the centerpieces? Right? There’s some grumbling in the room that, you know, students get into politics. They don’t have to take math. Why is he making us do this? Or whatever, but then they kind of write it out on a piece of paper, and they come up with an answer, right? So that’s a moderately challenging question. You can answer it in your head, but for most people, they would use pen and paper and come up with an answer to that. You know, they get it. They write it down. Then you ask them of very easy math question, right? You say, all right, you want to buy a bat and a ball. The bat and the ball together cost $1.10. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does a ball costs? Right? People are, you know, fairly comfortable. Write it down and bring it up. Almost everybody says that the ball costs 10 cents, right? So they all write down 10 cents, but the ball actually costs 5 cents, right? And it’s because the ball costs 10 cents, and the bat costs $1.00 more than the ball, then the bat would cost $1.10, and together, they would cost $1.20, but because the ball costs 5 cents, the bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. The bat is $1.05, and together, they cost $1.10. And everybody gets that question wrong, right? I got it wrong, too, when I was reading through the book. That’s not my example. It’s Kahneman’s example. I trick everybody I know with that question. So why is that? Right? How is it that we can answer correctly a quite difficult math question, and yet are incorrect when it comes to a far simpler, you know, math question. And Kahneman’s answer is that it’s because, in the first case, we know our intuition can’t handle the job. We have no intuition of what, you know, 17 times 25 is. Right? Or very few of us actually do. So we write it out. We can’t use our intuition, but in the second case, we have an immediate intuitive reaction. Right? I know what that is, 10 cents, boom. Ten cents, and you hand it in. But the intuition is wrong, right? And the intuition is wrong because the question is actually designed to bias your intuition, in a particular way to thinking of tens, a dollar, 10. Your intuition just spits out 10. You didn’t really think about it. It’s your sort of, you know, your lazy controller. And the idea is that most of what we do, on a day-to-day, the overwhelming majority of what we do is actually this sort of lazy intuition, all right? So lazy intuition that works. We don’t really think things through rationally. We just kind of have a gut feeling, and we go with that, and the moral psychologist, Jonathan Haidt, in another very influential book, The Righteous Mind. Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. He says, listen. Your politics comes from your intuition, right? It comes from your intuition. Your morals come from your intuition. These are not things that you’ve thought about like you think about math equation. These are things that you just feel to be true, and then have gone out into the world and found all kinds of rational arguments in support of, right? This is his basic argument. He has all kinds of great examples of this. I mean, you know, all kinds of great examples. You know, one is, for example, he asked about incest. That if you ask people about incest, they have an immediate reaction like, oh, gosh, disgusting, right? And then you say, well, why is that? And they give all kinds of rationalizations for why they think incest is wrong. But the rationalizations are just complete — well, they’re just complete rationalizations, right? They’re not the reasons. They’re just the reasons that people cite for explaining something they feel to be wrong intuitively. Right? Other examples, ask college students, you know, if they’re atheists. Right? You know, quite a considerable number will say, yeah, I’m an atheist. I don’t believe in God. Then ask them to sell you their soul for $2, right? And, you know, most atheists won’t actually sell you their souls,, right? Or at least a lot won’t for two bucks, which is, you know, the great question, right? Why don’t atheists sell their souls? So there’s just kind of intuitive aspect that anchors a lot of our moral aspects. In terms of the innate side of it, the innate side of the evidence. So here’s some influential work. It’s a mix of political scientists and behavioural geneticists, and they’re trying to understand potentially innate elements of human behaviour, right? I mean, they try to think of it in these ways. And politics is a little bit far off to be usually conceptualized in terms of innate predispositions, and it isn’t the case that all of left-right politics, or even, arguably, a large chunk, or most of left-right politics can be explained by things that people inherit, and I’d like a little bit of time, but I’ll tell you — I’ll give you the general set up of their design. And the general set up of the design is this. Let’s compare of the politics of identical twins, who share 100% of the same genetic DNA and nonidentical twins, who share, on average, 50% of the same genes, and given that both identical twins and nonidentical twins are raised by the same parents in the same house in the same community at the same time, are the same age, and so on and so forth. If there is no heritable component. There’s no, you know, part of political difference that’s explained by things that you inherit and things in your genes, then we should expect to see that nonidentical twins and identical twins are both equally alike when it comes to politics, right? They should be, if one’s, you know, a staunch conservative, then the other should be a staunch conservative to the exact same degree, regardless of whether they’re identical twins or nonidentical twins. But in fact, in study after study, they find that this simply is not the case, all right? And I’ll show you their measures, sort of formalization of their measures, but they find study after study that identical twins are considerably more likely to be similarly politically. So they’re more likely to share the same kinds of politics than are nonidentical twins. In fact, nonidentical twins are no more likely to be similar to each other than our any other sort of regular sibling, right? So, but identical twins are very likely to be similar to each other. So if one is a hard conservative, the other one is likely to be a hard conservative. If one is a hard liberal, on the left, the other is likely to be quite far on the left. So this finding strongly suggests the presence of some heritable element. In fact, they find that — they say that 16% is attributable to shared environment, which means growing up in the same household explains 16% of the variation in ideology, as they see it; 32% is attributable to heritability, and 53% here is attributable to unshared environment. So just random stuff. There is still differences between identical twins. The key finding here, though, is that the differences between identical twins are considerably smaller than the differences between nonidentical twins, and if it isn’t genes, they ask, then what else could possibly explain this, right? It’s an interesting question and quite controversial. What about social aspects? This is another — there’s all kinds of different examples of this that you could use. What are social aspects? How does this matter? Well, I don’t know if any of you are sports team enthusiasts, right? But it seems to be the case that people attach themselves to a sports team at some early period of their life. Often, because it’s the sports team from their region or the one from where they grew up or whatever, and then they cheer for that sports team no matter what. It doesn’t matter who the players are, how the team is doing. You know, and they go and watch again, like, you know, in Leafs Nation, right? It’s always easier to sort of make this case, right? That you can never doubt the loyalty of the Maple Leafs fan. But you know, and they watch the game. And the referee makes a call, and one side genuinely sees it one way. Like that was clearly a penalty. The other side doesn’t see it that way. So there’s all kinds of evidence that these sort of social aspects of identification with a group strongly influence people’s politics. And here’s a graph I really like. There’s a bit of a back story to it. The back story goes something like this. Nobody really makes money in the political business. I mean, you know, make some money there, but for the most part, the way market research firms who conduct polling, the way they make money is they run studies for corporations and companies who pay them quite a bit of money to do things like track our brand. How is our brand doing in public opinion? You know, if you’re United Airlines, for example, you sort of watch, right, as your brand dropped out, and you think, okay, we clearly have a problem. I wonder what happened, right? You know, if you like that. But that’s what they’re interested in. So that’s really where market research firms make their money, but sometimes, they’ll tack on to the end of the survey that they’ve done and has been paid for by a corporation, they’ll tack on a corporation, they’ll tack on a question about politics that they can then send out to the newspapers. Usually for free, but from which they then get some publicity, right? Like according to Ipsos or according to whatever company, this number of people are going to vote for Clinton or whatever or Trump, and that’s how they do this. So this is an example of what happened over very long period of time with the company Godfather’s Pizza, right? Which is a pizza company. And they sell pizza, and they send out surveys that say, you know, how does our pizza taste? So they can see if they’re doing innovations or something, whether or not people notice. And ask people how does it taste, and they redo the surveys time and time again. And then at the end of the survey, the company to tacks on, you know, are you a Democrat or a Republican or independent, right? Just sort of — it’s a couple of other reasons for that, but mainly, just to sort of get a lay of the political landscape. And so, for a very long period of time, you know, you ask democrats, Republicans, independents, how they like Godfather’s Pizza. They tend to like Godfather’s Pizza. So here, negative is we hate it. It’s disgusting. You know, positive means we love it. Best pizza, whatever, and you sort of go along, and there’s no difference between democrats, Republicans, and independents, in terms of how they rate that taste of Godfather’s Pizza. Then Herman Cain announced his candidacy for the Republican nomination for president, and all the sudden, Republicans start to like the taste of Godfather’s Pizza more in the surveys, and democrats start to like the taste of Godfather’s Pizza less than the surveys, right? So Republicans, like, yeah, it’s a great pizza. You know, it’s better-than-average. And democrats are sort of the opposite. Then Herman Cain is embroiled in a sexual harassment complaint at Godfather’s Pizza, and now it is the best pizza Republicans have ever had And sort of disgusting for democrats, right? So, you know, you think of pizza preferences as having a partisan element in the United States, right, because of association with one of the political leaders, but here’s the thing. And this operates, I should say, like some kind of social identity. There’s other kinds of social identity. So party is a social identity. There’s other sorts of social identity, here’s the big thing. We think about pizza, and you think who cares? But there’s the same evidence for attitudes about same-sex marriage, for attitudes about abortion, for attitudes about, you know, racial equality, for attitudes about gender equality, for all kinds of different opinions, the evidence suggests that the parties take a position first. Then a lot of their supporters follow. All right, it’s not the case that parties are asking in trying to find out what their supporters want. It is the case for most of us some of the time and for some of us virtually all of the time, all of our positions about politics are heavily influenced if not outright determined by the party that we belong to, by the messages that they send. Which is why, when you see something like, you know, the Republican Party shifting directions on a number of different issues, you can bet that this is going to resonate in public opinion for quite some time, because there are Republicans who are changing their minds about things, because their party has gone off in a different direction. The same happens among democrats. So that’s the social aspect. I’ll quickly go through, you know, one of the, I think, elephants in the room, frankly, when it comes to explanations, which is when we think of media affects. You know, initially when, you know, social scientists went out and started asking people where they get their information about politics, everyone says the media. Right? I mean, at some point, it’s either directly the media. I read a newspaper. I watch TV, or whatever, or its indirectly. Well, I talked to so-and-so. And then you go and talk to so-and-so and ask them where they get their information, and they get it from the media somewhere, right? Some kind of media. So the initial assumption was, given that almost all of the political world is only accessible to us through the media, surely, then, the media must have a massive influence on the way people think about politics, right? You know, sort of, the media must determine how people think about politics. So they went out to study this in different, sort of, innovative ways, and actually found that the media seemed to have a virtually no effect at all. When it came to the question of how people, you know, what people feel about particular issues, as far as researchers could tell, there was no effect. So this gave rise to what’s called a sort of minimal effects hypothesis. But then, as people started to ask the question a different way, and they started to say, okay, maybe the media doesn’t really tell us what to think, but could there be other influential ways that the media might sort of affect people’s thinking about politics? And it turns out that there was. One of the very influential ways was this notion of agenda setting, all right? Which is the idea that the media isn’t really successful at telling us what to think, but it is, to use the term from Cohen stunningly successful at telling us what to think about. So the kinds of things that we think are important are almost entirely determined by what’s circulating in the media. The media starts talking about stuff. We then come to think of those things as being important. Also, how we think about a particular issue. So the kinds of things we think are relevant when we think about a particular issue. You might take the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for example. The kinds of things that you think are most relevant when you think of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there is also evidence that the media can influence those. So this is known as a framing effect. But even with all of that, we still find a smaller effect for the media than what we might expect otherwise. And we ask ourselves why that is. Why is the media effect not as large as we might have thought? There turns out to be quite an interesting dynamic between sophistication, exposure, and influence, and the argument is this. People who are highly sophisticated politically, people who are engaged in politics regularly, think, eat, sleep, brief politics, are unlikely to be influenced by some story that they read in the news, because they know that that story is just one perspective, and they have this sort of broader repertoire of perspectives that they can draw on in their memory. And so this one story doesn’t influence them. Right? So highly sophisticated people, unlikely to be influenced by some new piece of political information. People who are very likely to be influenced by new information are people who are not very sophisticated, who don’t know much about an issue, who don’t think much politically, who aren’t able to recognize bias when they see it. They just take it as being the description or the way the world is. So those people are very likely to be influenced by media information. But the thing is that people who are very likely to be influenced by information, who are unsophisticated, don’t really follow politics regularly, are unlikely to actually be exposed to political information historically, because they don’t read the politics section of the newspapers or sit at home and watch the national. They read sports or the funny pages or whatever else. They’re not interested in politics. So the people most likely to be influenced are the least likely to be exposed. And the people most likely to be exposed are the least likely to be influenced. So this basic model is used historically to explain why the media doesn’t have the massive effect we might have anticipated. But I would argue that we are in desperate need, very quickly, of a new model, because the old days of people having to seek out political news quite actively, right? You had to watch the nationals. Unlikely the national was just going to come on, and you’re going to have a sit there and watch it. Right? You had to seek it out or go get a newspaper and read the politics. Those are undermined by things like infotainment. So the creation of movies that have political messages embedded in them that can reach audiences that might not otherwise think of themselves as being highly politicized. Twitter. It’s almost impossible to be on Twitter if you’re following anybody without being exposed to political messages and Facebook. So now people who don’t eat, sleep, and breathe politics historically are being exposed to these different kinds of political narratives, and so we might be interested to know what effect that’s having on the level of political polarization. My argument and the argument of others, or at least my hunch and the hunch of others, is that is having a pretty big impact on why people are more divided. So what’s going on in the US? You know, the last election is really unprecedented in modern times in the United States. You know, people have different politics. We say, left, right. There’s, you know, good arguments that you hear from conservatives. Good arguments that you hear from conservatives. Good arguments that you hear from folks on the left and others, but the last election is really unprecedented. You know, I have my thoughts on Trump, obviously, but my thoughts on Trump have nothing to do, almost nothing to do with his policy positions, right? You know, like I said, put it this way. Trump is a different character than Bush. There’s no — there’s similarities, good objections to both, but this is a whole different thing that we’re dealing with here. And you know, one of the questions was what does Trump reflect? Right? Is it a culture war? And, well, sort of an argument that’s been going on for a decade in the United States for quite a long time is, you know what? Elites in the United States are divided, but regular folk start, right? Regular people have never heard of this culture war. And this is the argument that seemed to dominate for decades in the United States. We can ask ourselves is that true? Is it the case that this is just like eggheads? This is just politicians arguing about politics, but regular people are not actually divided. And the argument is that, well, it’s not true, right? Nowadays, regular people are intensely divided on political lines, and I’ll show you some evidence of that. So first of all, as far as elites go, and this graph is often shown just from here over, but I’ll show you the whole thing. This is the extent of ideological polarization. These are measured by Poole and Rosenthal, American political scientists, and this is ideological polarization in the House of Representatives in the United States. So what this is measuring as the extent to which Democratic legislators vote together and the extent to which Republican legislatores vote together. And for many years, and many decades prior to the 90s, in the United States, the most conservative Democrat legislator was more conservative than the most liberal Republican legislator. So you had overlap between the parties, right? You had people you could go to on both sides to try to reach bipartisan compromise. That no longer exists, right? What this graph shows is that really, beginning in the 90s, and intensifying, Republicans are now voting together at very high rates. Democrats are voting together at very high rates, and the most liberal Republican is now more conservative than the most conservative Democrat. So the centre has hollowed out of American Congress. It no longer exists. You see the same pattern actually in the senate, right? So it’s the same thing. You know, part of this is the southern Democrats, right, sort of really coming online and becoming with just regular Democrats, and the old southern Democrats, it looks like, you have left and gone to the Republican Party. So there’s clear polarization here. When you look at political party election platforms, you know, you see some slight evidence of heightened polarization, but it’s not captured as perfectly as we might have liked. So Republicans move a little bit to the right in the 80s under Reagan, but we don’t see the Democrats moving too much to the left. So some polarization, but not that much when it comes to what they’re seeing in elections. But here’s really, I think, the important graph. This is a graph which captures from 1964 until 2012 how Democrats, people who self-identify as Democrats, feel about both the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, and what you see here is that, you know, on a scale of 0 to 100, Democrats feel about the same as they ever have about their own political party. It’s about even. But they’ve gone from being sort of a different about the Republicans to being outright hostile, right? So there’s an increase in hostility here among Democrats, relative to the Republican Party, and this is as much data as we have. There’s nothing hidden in the back of this graph. There’s no public opinion data that I have access to before this. When we look at Republicans, we see the exact same thing, right? Republicans just as enthusiastic about their own party is they’ve ever been, but are now much more hostile towards the Democrats. And the data here for Trump weren’t available, but, I mean, we wouldn’t have to take bets to realize that this has now hit rock bottom yet again. Right? So there is a lot of polarization in the United States. It’s not just the elites. It’s regular people, as well. Regular rank-and-file Democrats and Republicans. I don’t want to leave Canada out, but I want to leave plenty of time for Q&A. What’s happening in Canada? Historically, Canada was supposed to be a country where the left-right divide didn’t apply. We were often considered, even through the 80s, as being a country that didn’t have a left-right politics like every other country. That’s no longer true. Since the advent of the Reform Alliance Party in the 90s, and you can see the left wing move on the NDP, in the 90s. There has been a very notable left-right divide in Canadian politics. The liberals are here in the middle. So higher positions are right. Lower positions are left, and this is year of the election in Canada. These are manifesto data. So party platforms. What you’re seeing more recently in Canadian politics, in the 2015 election, is that there is a cluster of political parties on the centre left. New Democrats, the Liberals, the Green Party, to a lesser degree the Bloc Québécois. So there’s this bunch of parties fighting for the same voters of the centre-left, and the conservatives occupy exclusively the right of Canadian politics. So there is a left-right divide in Canada. When you look at different issues, so these are answers to questions about welfare state, gay rights, capital punishment, immigration, abortion, the environment, and these are the best data we have for Canadians over time. You also see evidence of more polarization between the supporters of different parties. So conservatives move to the right of centre of the question of the welfare state. So they want to cut the welfare state, or more likely to want to cut it. The NDP sort of moves left, but you can see a pretty notable left-right divide into thousand 10 that didn’t exist in the 70s. Similar kinds of questions about gay-rights. These are different question wordings over time, for obvious reasons. Capital punishment, we see a similar pattern. Abortion, again, immigration, the environment. We see the same thing. So parties are differentiating, and so, too, are the people who support the parties. So we are seeing some sorting and polarization. One graph that I think is telling, and this, again, it’s not just a Canadian-American thing. This is occurring elsewhere, this is the same graph that I showed you in the United States, but for all the Canadian parties, New Democrats, Liberals, Conservative, Reform Alliance, and what you see here, as in the United States, New Democrat partisans, people who identify as New Democrats, are, you know, they dipped in the 90s. It was a disastrous time for the party. They come back up. But New Democrats like their party today about as much as they did in the late 60s. But they certainly don’t feel the same way about the conservatives, all right? So very sort of — a lot of hostility here. You can see for Liberals there’s this little bit of a, you know, love connection with the New Democrats in the Laten era, even into the Mulcair era. Liberals are not hostile towards the New Democrats. About as enthusiastic about their own party, though it’s been declining for a while, and they dislike the conservatives more. For conservatives, again, the 90s were a disaster, right? That was the ’93 election, where they reduced to two seats. They like the liberals more than their own party. That’s telling something, right, in ’93, but for the most part, conservatives feel the same way. They’re becoming more hostile towards the other parties, and Reform Alliance, no surprise, they hate all of the other political parties. Which, you know, we can sort of, I’ll add this kind of close-up visual. But anyway, so what can we conclude from all of this? Well, first and foremost the 2016 American election did not come out of the blue. Trump is not an unexpected character. If you were to ask, election after election, everything just keeps getting more and more and more polarized. You know, where does that end? Nobody really knows yet, but Trump certainly is not unexpected, given what you see. The American politics, like politics of many other countries, has been more divide and more embittered for a very long time. People like each other less and less across political lines now than they did. There have been other times of turmoil, as well., But recent decades, this is unprecedented, at least, and the pattern in Canada is the same. So thanks, I’m done. [ Applause ]>>So thank you very much for an engaging and chilling talk. I think we’re going to move right into the discussion. There are washrooms across the hall. There’s food at the back you can help yourself to, but we are going to start right away with the discussion, which I suspect is going to be long and interesting. And so if anyone has questions for Professor Cochran, if you could just wait until the microphone comes to you, that would be wonderful. Questions?>>Hello, my name is Pampelav [assumed spelling], and I have one question. In your view, the party divisions in Canada is following somewhat closely, or in the near future, the one we have outlined very clearly in your presentation. And then can you give us some time terms, approximately, at this point, what will happen within the next couple of years here in Canada? Thank you.>>Yeah, yeah, it’s great. Predictions, you know, I guess one thing I’ve sort of learnt is never make a prediction on camera or in print, right? I guess is the — I mean, then the answer is I don’t know what will happen, and there’s couple of reasons for that. And I will give you one thing that I think is a bit counterintuitive that people might not be aware of or think of. I actually do think the Liberal Party is in long-term trouble, despite the fact that Justin Trudeau is a very popular leader, who was able to stave off a decades long period of decline within the Liberal Party in the last election. You know people would say, for example, the Liberals are back. You know, that was sort of the line, right? That this is the return of the historic governing party in Canada, but the result that Trudeau won with in the last election was worse than the result that his father lost with in the 1979 election. So the Liberals have been experiencing a decline for some time. And the challenge for the party, it seems to me, is as politics shifts from a politics of nation building, which the liberals are very well-suited to handle, into a politics of left-right divide, it’s difficult for the liberals to chart an independent course, because they have always said, historically they are the Canadian party, and the party of the centre. The problem is, and we see some signs of this already, the problem is being the party of the centre, you might be able to get new Democratic voters if they’re scared of conservatives, right? That might happen. That happened for the Liberals in the last election. I suspect is going to happen again in the next provincial election, for the provincial liberals, but the problem is that you start to get sort of encroached on the left. So you already see this. People are saying that the liberals aren’t strong enough in support, for example, of resource development in Alberta. So they’re not going to get any conservatives. Because there’s a lot of the conservative party that says, you know what? Forget about a lot of these environmental policies. We’re just going to grow the economy, and on the left you have people who say, well, Liberals are approving pipelines, right? The not actually preserving the environment. And so people on the left are becoming less enthusiastic. People on the right are never going to be enthusiastic. So the liberals of the risk, I think, of being squeezed out as soon as Justin Trudeau ‘s popularity wanes a bit more than it has already. So the liberals, I think, are going to have to find a way to define themselves, either by merging with the NDP, de factor, or sort of, you know, formally. They’ll have to find that out. I don’t know where the Conservatives are going, and neither do they, actually. Neither does the Conservative Party, right? Because there’s very different candidates running in the conservative leadership race. Michael Chong, for example has nothing to comment with Kellie Leitch. It’s almost hard to imagine that those two are in the same political party, and the kinds of people supporting those two candidates are not similar kinds of people. They don’t have similar kinds of policy positions. So I really don’t know where the Conservative Party is going. I would say that I do think that a Trump-like agenda could do better in Canada than most people think. That was the one thing I would say. I don’t know that it could win. I actually don’t think it could win, overall, in the national election. I have no doubt that it could win within a conservative leadership race, for example. You know, my own view is that Kellie Leitch is not a strong candidate in some of any of the indicators we would normally use as a strong candidate, but she is actually doing quite well within the party, because she is articulating a set of views that are quite widely shared. I don’t think it’s a silent majority. I don’t even think it’s silent, but I think it’s a reasonable chunk of the Canadian population. So if Michael Chong pulls off an upset victory in wins as leader of the conservative party, or the conservative party, I should say, of Canada, the future left-right politics and the country will look very different than if somebody, you know, like Kellie Leitch wins or even a Maxime Bernier, frankly. So it’s hard to say. That’s the short answer. [ Inaudible Speech ]>>I’m asking whether a change to a PR system, and one that truly would allow for a true representation of people’s votes cast. You know, there are a number of systems available, but one that would give you a true representation of the popular vote in the house seats. Would that, and I know it would probably mean, going forward with a lot of minority governments, continuous, and a lot of coalitions, and they shift and change all over. I’m fascinated by Borgen TV show, with that, with that kick the whatevers out of this divide.>>Yeah, it would certainly — it certainly would intensify it, I think. In a sense that he would see, as you do in Europe, right? The parties would align in quite clear left-right terms. There’s some ambiguity in the centre. So I think it would intensify in terms of the party options, right? There are different views on it. Nobody really knows what would happen if we instituted a PR. I mean, my guess is, you know, certainly, the sky would fall. Right? I think some the claims for PR are overblown. Some of the things against it are overblown. Some of our claims for our current system are overblown. Some the claims against it. The main claim is that our current system ensures accountability and prevents extremist voices from getting too much recognition, but as you saw the United States in the last election, there’s no real guarantee that an outsider can’t infiltrate an insider-established party and then benefit from an electoral system designed, supposedly, to keep people like that out, right? Or to keep those sort of fringe views out. But if we were to adapt PR, we would have much greater diversity of views represented in the House of Commons. There’s no question. It’s not clear how much more diversity of views we would have represented in the cabinet. And that is sort of the interesting question, because one thing I can say for sure, the current party system we have in our single-member plurality system would not just be ported into a PR system. And you know, we’d be able to say, for example, that means the liberals and the Democrats are going to win permanently, because there would be a change in the party system that would follow the change electoral system. There would be many more political parties. So I guess pros and cons of it. Pros, more diversity of opinions in the House of Commons. Cons, some would argue, more diversity of opinions in the House of Commons. Unclear what effect it would have on cabinet government. You know, you can look, and one can always point to different cases of government instability. I don’t buy those. There’s a lot of very stable governments in Europe, but there are certainly cases that, you know, someone who studies European government would be able to identify of political parties that stay in power. They stay in cabinet for a very long period of time, despite massive fluctuations in their levels of popular support. So the Freedom Party of Austria, far right Nationalist Party, widely seen as sort of anti-immigrant, right? I mean, one of their policies was that no foreign-born people should be able to have a job until every single native-born Austrian had a job. So these are the kinds of policies they advocated. They won 27% of the vote, and there was the 2000, or maybe it was 1999. But in/around election, they were brought into cabinet, right? It’s pretty good; 27% of the popular vote is very good. They’re in cabinet. In the next election, people turned against them. Europe threatened to basically ostracize Austria for having a far-right Nationalist Party in cabinet. They were reduced to 11% of the vote and they stayed in cabinet, right? So that’s the kind of thing that you have to worry about. So it wouldn’t affect left-right politics, in my view. It would change our political system, I think in some ways for better, in some ways for worse, and for those interested in the political dynamics of support for PR, I mean, one thing I would say is historically, it’s been mainly on the left. It’s been mainly progressives who supported PR, and I think, to this day, that’s still true, but there are also a lot of people within the conservative party who supported PR, as well. So there’s more consensus, more of a support for that across party lines than the elites that we hear about, sort of give credit for. A lot of like social conservatives, for example, argue look, this conservative party is doing nothing for us, because it’s preoccupied with winning. So let’s just chart our own social conservative course. We’ll win what we win, in terms of share the popular vote, and then we’ll see if they need us or not after the election. So you hear that argument, for instance on the right. So PR wouldn’t affect it, and I really don’t know what PR would do to our political system in general. Good question.>>You have interestingly shown the what has happened, both of the individual voter’s and politics among the representatives. How about the why? Why did this happen? And if I look back at my own country, where I come from, the Weimer Republic, was that similarly divided at that time? And look what happened afterwards.>>Yeah, I mean, that’s a very good — you know, the comparisons to Germany, I’m always, you know, sceptical making perks I don’t know enough about the sort of German historical case, and what I think of it is anecdotal, but I do think a couple of things are worth remembering is that first, you know, the Nazis did come to power through, initially, Democratic means, at least within the electoral system. But secondly, they actually never received the majority of the popular vote in an election, right? So they managed to get in. I actually think they had something like 34-35% of the vote at their peak. Then they lost quite considerably, maybe were high 20s or something in the next election, that managed to seize power through internal institutional mechanisms. I so I think the conditions are quite different, but any time you are at risk of having, and this gets the electoral system point, as well. Any time you are at risk of having 30% or so of the population govern, I think you open yourself up to more unanticipated outcomes than if you require a majority through runoff or through different kinds of electoral systems. The why question, I don’t have an answer to, it is a great question. That is the question everybody — there are many different answers out there. You know, nobody really has a definitive answer. I think the hunch is that the media has something to do with this. Media fragmentation. There was always a view, for a long time, that a more fragmented media for different reasons would be more likely to produce a polarized public, because people increasingly choose their media, and they choose entirely different media. It’s not now the case that you have to choose between say five or six established sources, right? Now you have a wide variety of choice, and people who are reading Breitbart, for example on the right are probably not reading, you know, Mother Jones or whatever, sort of the equivalents are on the left, or some of the main left-wing sources. So now people are in echo chambers, to a greater degree, I think, then they have been historically. Another media-related explanation is that there’s a hollowing out of local newspaper coverage, which may have had a bit of an ideological bend historically, but the ideological bend wouldn’t be consistent, and now what you see is greater in guider concentration of the media in certain centres of the country, aiming at broader messaging, which tends to follow along left-right lines. So that’s one line of explanation that people offer. There is some evidence for it. There is some evidence that people who watch political exchange on television, for example, tend to be more hostile towards the other side afterwards. That’s one explanation. Another explanation, and this is the one I think is very broad and sort of difficult to pin down, another line of explanation is that we now live in a time where access information is just, it’s unprecedented. I mean, if you think of the access that a grade 6 or seven students sitting down at a computer has on the Internet to information, it rivals what researchers of any kind would’ve had at their disposal 20 or 25 years ago. So there’s a hurricane of information, really, that people are now exposed to, and what we could be seeing is just more of the sort of the ability of people to align the way that they feel with a set of arguments, which may be true or false. You know, arguments we have for our beliefs don’t have to be true, and they have a sort of a more sort of coherent ideological mindset of merging, just because any argument you want to make, you will be able to go online and find what sounds like a rational argument in support of it, right? So that could be another factor. The only thing I do know, or at least I think I know, based on what we see in the evidence, is that you can’t explain this just by looking at the United States. You can’t say, oh, well, something’s happening in American society. We need to figure out Trump. And, you know, the left-right divide in the US by looking at things just peculiar to the United States. Maybe it’s Congress or, you know, other explanations people drawn, because it’s happening in Canada. Its happening in the United Kingdom. It’s happening in France. It’s happening in Switzerland. It’s happening country after country after country. So my guess is the media, but the evidence for that, the direct systematic evidence is not as convincing yet as I’d like it to be.>>There’s a question in the back. [ Footsteps ]>>Hi. So I have a question. The last election, federal election, a lot of people, and provincial, there was the remark that a lot of people have thought that the Liberals had “outlefted” the NDP, and so I’m wondering, moving forward, is this their only way, there only secure way of holding government?>>Yeah, that’s a great question, and actually, in the data that I showed earlier, there’s a time lag built into the measure of left-right positions, to eliminate some of the noisiness over time. So a party’s left-right position was defined by the position it took in the current election; 50% of it is the position is the position it took the current election. A quarter of its left-right position was the position it took in a previous election, and then 12.5% is the position it took in the election previously, and so on and so forth. So there is a sort of stabilizing effect on that data. But just, if you take that away, actually, the liberals to emerge as more left-wing than the New Democrats in the last election. And that isn’t the first time. Also, under Stephane Dion, they emerged, but that was, in part, because of his green shift. So I guess, from the liberal point of view, yes, I think that is actually the strategy they ought to adopt to win. I think they could beat the NDP, and from the NDP point of view, the move to the centre is fine, as long as you don’t end up being more centrist than the liberals, and if you think in the last election campaign, for example, you know, what did the NDP campaign on? A balanced budgets. All right, that is not a historic NDP platform item. We’re going to balance budgets and support small businesses with tax relief, right? I mean these are not — that’s the centrist party’s platform, and the liberals, you know campaigned on equity. They campaigned on wealth redistribution. They campaigned on environmental protection, and it’s the oldest strategy in the liberal playbook, which is why those of us like me who say, well, things are changing now. This is an entirely different time. The liberals are in trouble. The NDP is on the rise, so on and so forth, and then all of the sudden, the liberals use exactly the same thing that they used, historically, which is, oh, watch out for the conservatives, and your Democrats are like, yeah, we’ve got to watch out for the conservatives. We’ll vote for the liberals, and now the liberals are the most sort of progressive party anyway. That’s right out of the old school liberal playbook, and it worked again. The question is, is there a lot of new Democrats now who are thinking to themselves, you know what? You know, for me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, you know, shame on you again. Fool me three times, but now, next time, you know, we’re not going to get fooled again, right? To use the Bush line. So that, I think, is the risk, right? That you could split the sort of left vote again, and then you might see a conservative, if they can get somebody who can appeal, you might see a conservative victory or eke out a minority government. They can also be overtaken, possibly, by the NDP, if the NDP get somebody in there who can appeal, and it’s harder to run as a progressive party, unless you have a progressive agenda after you’ve been in power, right? That’s always easier to do when you have no track record. Yep?>>I was going to invite questions.>>Okay, I have another question. So this is from a conservative perspective now. So there are a lot of social conservatives, and a lot of Millennial conservatives who feel like their party is not speaking to them, right? I guess my question is what is kind of the stubbornness with wanting to move from historical party ideas, you know, from many years past and kind of modernizing to some of the values that, you know, conservatives may still hold for social welfare or social justice. Like how can the party be competitive in future elections if there isn’t a reevaluation, complete reevaluation and somewhat overhaul in some areas, of some of their more traditional stances? And is that even possible? And if it’s not, then why? [ Inaudible Speech ]>>Yeah.>>Yeah, a — you know, there’s certainly a divide within the conservative party. Some argue it’s a generational divide between older and younger, and the divide is this sort of traditional conservative small government tax relief policies versus a new kind of, you know, it’s highly racialized, obviously in discourse. There’s a lot of discussion of race, identity, and so on so forth. Like pro Trump, you know, make America great again hats and that kind of thing, that seem to be more prevalent among younger conservatives and sort of a new generation, which I actually do think is directly Trump effect, or an American effect, Americanization of Canadian conservatism. Whether or not or how they’re going to align those two movements, I should say, I think the progressive conservatives have left the party. You know, the support, for guaranteed minimum income, for example, that you saw among some progressive conservatives, the Joe Clark types and others, I think they’ve already left. And now what you have is a more sort of economically focussed libertarian right allied with this new alt-right uncomfortably. I think even religious conservatives are, to some degree, less enamored with the direction of the party then they might have been historically. But you know, I think, the challenge is going to be how do they actually reconcile that divide? I don’t see the basis of reconciliation beyond their common opposition, right, the left, but even that, I think it’s going to be very challenging. One thing I would say is that when you think of Canada, like Kellie Leitch, for example, was really sort of appealing to a lot of this, and there are others, as well, that — and this is something that I think I’m mindful of what I watch how the sort of conservative leadership race unfolds is that a lot of what Kellie Leitch is saying directly is actually uncontroversial, right? Or it seems to me to be quite uncontroversial. So for example, the idea of interviewing immigrants to Canada, you know, about their sort of Canadian values or whatever, that’s a policy that really had always been in place for a very long period of time. Where anybody emigrating to Canada would have a meeting with an immigration officer, right? So if you were to implement a policy like that, behind the scenes, I don’t think people would be up in arms about it. I don’t think it would appeal to know, sort of alt-right supporters, but what she’s doing, intentionally and knowingly is appealing to that theme as, some would call it a dog whistle, but I don’t really think it’s a dog whistle, to attract the sort of more sort of anti-immigrant or anti-diversity right. And the reason I know she knows that is because I’ve also looked at her Facebook page, and you see the comments that come after one of her sort of mundane conversations. So surely, you know, she see those comments, as well, or her team sees those comments, as well and could clarify, right? But they don’t. So I would even say that Kellie Leitch is now positioned as sort of the alt-right candidate within the conservative party. She could be more explicitly alt-right. She’s still kind of subtle, almost polite about it, right, in some settings, but I do think within the conservative party, there’s quite a bit of support for that agenda. I think outside the conservative party, there could be more support than maybe we think, and I really don’t see any future in the conservative party for the old progressives.>>But how would the party — sorry, with the rising cost of living, right? And so you have — I’m just imagining if you were a conservative, and you need housing support or you’re, you know, you used to really value the party and its ideals, but now you’re finding that, you know, you have less money at the end of the month, or maybe your circumstances have gone and deteriorated so much that, you know, now you need social welfare. You know, like how is the party going to survive without moving much further than probably it’s comfortable with to the left moving forward?>>Yeah, I mean, it’s an almost a great example. A lot of the difference between the rational element and the intuitive aspect. The intuitive element of politics. And people have under this question for quite some time, like why in the US even? What are you so many people vote against their own material self-interest? I think a lot of it has to do with group identity. There are also sort of conflicting narratives. So what do people like me do, right? Where do I see people like me in the political environment, and you support it like you would a sports team, regardless of policies, regardless of leaders, and so on. I also think, you know, there’s sort of the conflicting narratives. I mean, to what extent are people pocketbook voters is a question people have looked at and found surprisingly not that much, right? It seems people, surprisingly, are not really focussed on pocketbook issues. You know, and as far as people abandoning the right, sort of what that would take, I mean, and I think the other narrative, if you think, for example what Trump was elected on and last election, what the conservatives might replicate here with somebody like Bernier on the economic front, the narrative is not you’re poor. Your job is insecure. You know, we’re going to cut your welfare benefits, right? The argument is always, you’re poor. Your job is insecure. We’re going to do things. Well, first of all, that because of these other people, whether it elites selling you out to offshore corporations or migrant labourers or illegal, you know, immigrants, or whatever else. If these people. We’re going to fix that, so that, you know, we’ll make America great again, or sort of make Canada great again, so I think people see their economic security in very different ways. The only thing I can really say from the evidence that I’ve come across in researching it is that the way that people see their reality is not, you know, as sort of calculated and as carefully considered as we might look at it from the outside, right? People have an intuitive feeling of where they belong. They have an intuitive feeling or even a desire for the world to work a particular way, and I think they’ll run with that, the evidence suggest, against countervailing evidence for a lot further than we might anticipate. I think the conservatives could come back, but I think, as always, the greater threat, and the greater opportunity for the conservatives isn’t what they do. It’s what the NDP and the liberals do. And if the New Democrats bail on the liberals, and you end up with divide, I see the conservatives being able to split and when. Minority government may become the majority again, maybe not in the next election, but after that. It’s a, I think, good opportunity.>>Good morning. I find this quite fascinating. I’m not a political follower, but you have certainly enlightened us all. You mentioned that Canada is the only country that has had a successful central party. Is that likely to continue, with all this going on around us, and if so, why Canada?>>Yeah, yeah, so, yeah, both very good questions. So the first question of why Canada. So why would Canada have this dominant centrist party. It was a mystery to me in my own work. There’s a new book coming out, it will be out, if it’s not out already from Richard Johnson at UBC, which looks that, actually, what were liberals in the Canadian setting? What ideological space did they occupy? And what he finds, he agrees that the centre is not an optimal position for political parties for the reasons that I mentioned here, but he says the liberals are only in the centre, on average, across Canada, on the left-right divide, and they’re also in the centre, on average, in Canada, on say, the nationalism versus Québec divide. But that’s only on average across the country. Within Québec, the liberals are the most pro-nationalist, pro-Canada party, and outside Québec, they are the most pro-Quebec party, right? So they have — they’re actually on different sides of that ideological dimension, in different parts of the country. So his argument was that the liberals didn’t win because of their ambiguity. They actually won because of the clarity, but they were clear in different ways in different places. So his view is that’s what sustained the liberals as the natural governing party of the country for quite some time, I don’t think the left-right divide is advantageous for the liberals, and unless they could move to, and as they tried to do, actually, change the electoral system. So that people’s references were ranked. I think that actually would have been a recipe for liberal success long into the future. I actually think there’s good reasons for moving in the direction of that kind of electoral system, as well. I think it’s unfortunate, and illegitimate, frankly, for the liberals to do that, because it would benefit them to such a considerable degree. So I guess I could say I agreed with their proposal, disagreed with them doing it the way that they went about doing it. I’m kind of glad they decided not to proceed. But barring that, I think the liberals are at a real risk of being squeezed out of the middle, and you already see it, right? New Democrats are not satisfied with the liberals’ environmental record, because the liberals are approving pipelines. Conservatives are not satisfied with the liberals’ resource development record, because liberals are talking about imposing a carbon tax, right, or cap and trade. So trying to tread the middle seems to have serious risks when it comes to most politically motivated segments of the population. And my hunch is that the New Democrats will have probably learnt their lesson from the last election, and if they can find a candidate that can appeal to large swaths of people and not risk appearing to be to the centre or to the right of the liberals, I think they have a chance of coming back. I think it was a mistake to get rid of Thomas Mulcair, personally. I thought he was a great leader of the opposition, the most effective leader of the opposition in my lifetime and since television began. I mean, in the House of Commons, but no question that the last campaign was not a success for them, and if you were to ask people what is the NDP about in this campaign? The answer is balanced budgets, right? They were ripe for the picking, and the liberals outsmarted them. I’d be surprised if they make that mistake again.>>But why in Canada do we have that success, where you don’t find that centre in the United States or in France or in Britain or Germany?>>So my answer is it’s the politics of nation building. That we’ve been so preoccupied in the country with, you know, what is Québec’s place in Canadian nation, and how do we align English and French, and really, this politics of nation building has, for a long time, given us a different political dimension than existed in other countries, which for different reasons was a more traditional left-right divide. So people in the 80s looked to Canada, for example, and even if you look at some of the data and you look back on Canadian history, there is no left-right divide between the parties. The parties were just trying to one up each other. You know, liberals did something that was to the left, the conservatives which is follow and do the same thing, right? You could see that sort of oscillating and no real systematic left-right divide. But I think what we are seeing, post Charlottetown referendum, post the Arab mega-constitutional politics in the 90s is the end of a politics of nation building in Canada. I don’t think we’re preoccupied, at least we haven’t been for the last 10 or 15 years with questions about Québec’s place in the country. I don’t think those are the kinds of questions are dominating politics in Québec, and I don’t think they’re the kinds of questions dominating politics outside the country. My hunch is we’ll probably never see those questions come to dominate again. That sort of a, maybe, a dangerous prediction, but I just don’t think there’s enough motivation in the country for people to feel about it the same way that they did and ’95 referendum, for example. So I suspect we will settle into a more stable pattern of left-right politics that characterizes countries elsewhere, and it will be up to the liberals to see if they can chart a unique course as a centrist party, or if they’re going to have to find a message that resonates to people as other parties in other countries have had to do over time.>>Any other questions or comments? [ Inaudible Speech ]>>I just wondered if you might comment on the misinformation, which Trump has used in order to get elected, and also the sheer nastiness and base things that we heard down in The States while he was riding to get into the position that he did. I just shake my head when I think of the same things happening in Canada, but are we headed that way after we hear people like Kevin O’Leary coming into the race, and so on?>>Yeah, yeah, I certainly hope not, but I agree with you, and one point I would make as well, and I learnt this about the time with Trump. That there is a traditional left-right divide, right, that is in the United States. So in the 80s, you could think of what people felt about Ronald Reagan, right? Some people viscerally disliked him, and you know, Reagan said things and did things that people — folks on the left wouldn’t like. You know, people opposed Bush, and they opposed Bush Sr. and Bob Dole, right, and all these other sort of conservatives. But what Trump is doing is a very different category. It’s got nothing to do with his policies. It’s not to do with, you know, what you think of his largest tax break in history. It’s got nothing to do with what you think of his, you know, positions on appointing pro-life judges to the Supreme Court or something like that. It’s the other things that he’s done. You know, and no one really has an answer, because we’ve never seen this before in the data age. My hunch is that a lot of that stuff, you will be able to — you can’t undo it. Right? Once it’s out there, it’s out there. So the, you know, the violence at rallies, for example. The, you know, comments about the media. The applauding movements in other countries that are sort of anti-Democratic authoritarian. I think it’s changed the way American politics will be perceived, and the impact American politics will have for a very long time. I just think it’s — once those horses are out of the barn, you’re not getting the back. That’s my sense. The fake news stuff, you know, the challenge that we face there is overwhelming. It’s not a matter of, you know, we talked a little bit like can you inoculate students to fake news or can you resist it yourself? Well, the stuff pools professors. It fools, you know, politicians. It’s because it’s carefully designed. Well, two things. First of all, there’s a multi-billion-dollar, in some cases, state-sponsored industry designed to actually present news in a particular way, and to distribute that news to support, you know, in the case of Russia, for example, to support the agenda of the Kremlin, and the RT, which is widely circulated. It’s available on all your televisions. You see nicely packaged clips presenting a different perspective on the news. That’s not like the CBC, right? This is a news organization designed to promote in large measure an agenda that Russia wants to see, or the Kremlin wants to see in the rest of the world. So as one person, it’s very difficult to sort of resist that. Then you have all of the sort of private construction of completely false news. Which because it accords with people’s pre-existing beliefs, people share uncritically, right? Because again, it’s not politics — politics isn’t rational. It’s the intuition, right? Aha, I feel this is true, right? Sweden has fallen into sharia law. I feel that to be true, so I’m going to share this, right? I’m going to agree to this and send it out. Or Toronto has fallen into sharia law which are things that I’ve heard and seen people truly, honestly believe on the Internet. I mean, as fact, and they share it, and it circulates. It really, with social media, what we do about it, right? The old argument we would have in Canada is let’s look at it on the sort of demand-side. What we’re going to do is we’ll regulate the media. We’ll regulate telecommunications policies. We’ll have all sorts of things in place that will prevent this kind of information getting to Canadians. That doesn’t work anymore. So now we have to focus, as best as I can tell, entirely on the demand-side by, as best as we possibly can. Teaching people to be critical consumers of news, and not just critical consumers of news on one side of the ideological agenda, but critical consumers of news period. Because as soon as you start to imbue your suggestions with substantive content, you sort of trigger these ideological reactions that we see, these intuitive reactions. So if you want to show pro-Trump fake news, there’ll be a bunch of Trump supporters in the audience will say, oh, yeah, fake news, right? Or if you want to show pro-Democrat fake news, there’ll be a lot of people who say, oh, yeah, you know, this is just the sort of right agenda, right? I think what we have to do, and maybe as a university professor, this is a typical thing to say, but I think what we have to do is to teach people the, really, the architecture or the structure of what a properly reasoned argument looks like, what evidence looks like, and it’s no longer the case that you just have to teach this to a small share of the population. Everybody has to be equipped with this now. If you’re going to be on Twitter, or you’re going to be on Facebook, unless you are equipped with us, you’re going to be fooled, and even if you are equipped with this, you’re still going to be full., Just hopefully, less often, right? So I don’t have the answer to that. That’s my thoughts on that. Certainly, I’ve been thinking about it quite a bit. I’ve never seen anything like we saw in the last election. I’ve never seen anything, actually, like this in American politics, and I’m not optimistic, actually, about the near-term, anyway, for the American political environment. I’m much more optimistic about Canada, actually. So, yep.>>Other questions or comments? Okay, well, I like to say thank you very much if I can say Chris.>>Yes, definitely.>>For a fantastic talk and discussion I thank you for your engagement, and I would like to end with a bout of clapping just to say thank you, and then I’ll move on. [ Applause ] Really, thank you all. [ Applause ] At this point, I would also like to encourage you to think about coming back in the fall, when our series resumes. This is really a wonderful opportunity for us to engage with you as members of the community, and another opportunity is coming up. I want to point out, if you don’t know already, that the North American Indigenous Games are going to be — some of the events will be held here at UTSC. That’s coming up this summer, and on Monday, May 29th, in the meeting place, 1 to 4 PM, we do have an event that will include indigenous culture, an introduction to the games, and an opportunity to learn more about what’s going to happen the summer, and to volunteer, if you wish to, during those games. So please do join a similar to bit about those games. And again, I’d like to thank Chris, and thank you all for attending this seminar series. [ Applause ]

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