Causes and Consequences of Populism Session

Causes and Consequences of Populism Session



all right welcome everybody to this pre-conquest session on populism clearly we underestimated the popularity of of this topic so hopefully there's some of you can still sit on the on the stairs a few more seats here or more stairs should I say you want to squeeze in populism is on the rise everywhere it takes different forms think about brexit trumpism it different countries also experienced the rise of populism to different extent but it's nevertheless a very sizeable and global phenomenon that is likely to affect policies going forward so when my program co-chairs Silvana Tamara and I thought about the scientific content of this Congress we thought this was a good time for us as a profession to stake to take stock of what we know about the phenomenon the exciting new research that's being carried out on the phenomenon and also about what we can do as a profession to address the topic study the topic but also deal with the rise of populism so we've brought together a set of four distinguished speakers who are currently doing work on populism and study different aspects of this so there's clearly no pretense here to be exhaustive but really to give different angles and open the debate the rules of the game is that each of them is going to be given 17 minutes not more okay if if they manage during the presentation to inter – it's always react to a previous presentation after I'm going to give them a little bonus what I do want it to keep time for discussion at the very end ok so here's just a few key questions to be dealt with but in the interest of time I'm going if the first word – Sasha Becker from the University of Warwick if I get the mouse moving no no my slides okay um so this is based on joint work I do with two vorak colleagues and 14 months ago I had no intention whatsoever to work on populism but that was on the 21st of June and then the 23rd came and so what we have as a starting point is that the UK seemed to be enthusiastic about you at some point or its predecessor even Maggie Thatcher campaigned for the EEC at the time when there was another referendum 1975 just two years after the UK had joined but now and we're in a situation where the will of the people counts a lot and where judges are called enemies of the people in the press and we're the people of this country have had enough of experts and we'll hear more about that from Piarco and his talk I guess so what happened then after referendum is that with these two colleagues we set together maybe with the week after referendum said look why did this happen we don't really understand it and try to write a paper on it that is now coming out in the issue of economic policy so the motivation for that is that UK about to lift you as you all know and brexit can be seen as a key moment in British history it triggered a new government there is a lot of uncertainty right now in the economy and for foreigners and it dominates the media discourse every day practice it is on the front pages of all newspapers there's a lot of polarization in the country and when it comes to feelings about you even within families there are all these stories of parents and kids being at each other's throat about how they voted and is it also a key moment of European this integration or integrations Europe getting its act together now in some way or is it gonna dis interpret as some people have thought we just don't know the UK exit negotiations have just begun so the question we ask here are what are the fundamental factors behind the praxic vote this is a map of who voted how in a referendum and you see that in different so-called local authorities that's what the Brits called counties the vote leave share very somewhere between the lower 20s up to 75% and there is a lot of variation across the country at a very macro level but even within relatively restricted areas there's a lot of variation now after referendum happened some and peace some weird sample drawn by some social scientists of MPs and Britain was asked what was the key reason that perhaps it happened and in this word cloud who see that immigration features very highly and generally in the debate often the point is made that this is all about you as you might think but is it really so if we look at variation in the data is it factors related to integration such as trade shares with you stock and flows of foreigners from the you from other countries around the world so what is it really in the public debate trade and FDI often have a very good connotation in the media they are not seem too critical but immigration in the press at least is something that features extremely highly but then it turns out in the data that the actual exposure to migration explains relatively little of the variation in the voltage share more important in contrast our eighth structure education and some measures of economic decline so how do we go about that without going into details since I have no time why so ever that is turned round I don't know because it is upside down stretch anyways what we do is we do a machine learning exercise so we take a broad set of variables and instead of so-to-say handpicking variables that we think might have been factors in the Praxis vote we let the data speak so we pick sets of variables and have the largest predictive power of the vote leaf result overall using the whole set of verbs we have we can explain close to 90% of the variation with the parables we have and if you go by subsets of variables variables that in one way or another capture you exposure or trade migration et cetera explained the lowest chair when they are taken by themselves more is explained by public services measures or weather risks good service by the NHS and enough places in schools etc but by far the largest explanatory power in terms of our squares comes from demographic variables and education so for instance low education predicts portly and also economic structures or sectoral structure importance of manufacturing and so on all that also explains quite a bit but the variables that at least officially should matter like you relate things matter NIST and what we also do is look at data within cities so maybe these 380 counties are not finally it is aggregated enough so let's look within cities and also within cities like Crystal granite London Nottingham and Birmingham there is a lot of variation and that's not surprising because ultimately the largest variation we have once we go to the individual level where we have zeros and ones yes/no now and somewhere in between is areas where people that somehow are similar aggregate and live in the same neighborhood and what we find is that also we look at this within city variation when we match that was measures of deprivation those have quite some predictive power along the same lines of the variables we have at the local authority level what we also did not least because the editors asked us to is to to use the British model take two British coefficients and Pring them to French data and try to predict lepen and that seems to be decently well so very broadly speaking that suggests that the same factors that drove people to vote live in the UK also are the same factors that favor the pen in France so finally what we are working on right now we got access to microdata from understanding society the former B DHBs which has the praxic referendum question at the individual level so we can use individual level covariance and so on and go through a similar prediction exercise but using individual level data and that's because you might be worried about ecological fallacy when you use applicant data and so on but we seem to find the same pattern also at the individual level and then this being a survey that has all kinds of additional variables that we don't measure at the aggregate level we can also look at these additional predictors for instance people who are in worse health are more likely to vote leave people with less access to media and to technology and fast internet and so on are more likely to vote leave and also people on unearned income support and so on are more likely to vote leave so this whole paper which is now coming out is largely a prediction exercise we don't make any claims of causality we don't say are this factor cost vote leaf but it's more a big descriptive exercise now in order to get a little bit closer to causality we have follow-up papers to mofetta where we zoom in on one specific factor which is migration from Eastern Europe and that's currently in working paper status and the motivation for that is that one of the variables we looked at at some point in this previous paper was the YouTube vulture the UK Independence Party in European Parliament elections while European Parliament because different from the national elections in the UK where we have first-past-the-post where people may vote strategically knowing that if they vote you keep still the Conservatives win and in the European Parliament elections also the British people vote by proportional voting so they are probably more likely to vote also for UK and it turns out that the correlation between both leave and you could vote chair is hasn't asked we're up 75 percent so it's an extremely tight correlation so we thought if we understand somewhat more about the rise of UK and European Parliament elections that by extension also tells us a little bit more about a potential causal factor behind present one cause effect so this is Luke approaches in the 1999 European Parliament election which was the first where the Brits voted by proportional voting and there the colors are all very lightly shaded because then as we move on they drum up so as you might know you keep now currently is the largest British party in the European Parliament they got a higher vulture than the Conservatives and labor and in some parts of the country well about 50% so why that is again turn no one knows and but that's what it is just by eye ball what you kept us is generally play with the idea that foreigners take away jobs of natives the funny thing is this guy in the ad is an Irish actor but that was the marketing agency who employed him and and they also play with this idea that there is pressure on services that there are waiting lists and schools because of over subscription to to migration now could do UK have seen it coming that there might be a lot of migration from Eastern Europe well there was a report commissioned by the Home Office and I know the people who wrote it academics and UK high profile people who were extremely carefully laying out what the assumptions are behind the numbers they produced there is a range of numbers but deliberately the home office wanted to pick the lowest possible numbers in all the scenarios and that's what ended up in the early pages of the report and the public laymen debate was we expect 5 to 13,000 Eastern Europeans per year coming to the United Kingdom now the issue that was overlooked not by the academics because at the time the report was written and the assumption was that all you countries open their borders to Eastern European migration from day one at the end of 2003 in contrast some countries argued for a transition period and you see here the years you countries that open their border to Eastern European migration from day one had a seven-year phase-in period now that Polish people couldn't go to Germany where did they go well to the UK so the actual migration numbers were far higher that is based on stops in 2001 and you see that by 2011 there are just 600,000 Polish people now so per year roughly 100,000 poles came and not 5 to 13 thousand so Tony player by now has completely forgotten about this and says we had no idea and that might happen and he gets lots of other facts wrong with this funny newspaper article there is obviously a huge literature on the effect of my creation on voting across the world of no time to talk about that but let me just mention a few highlights about this expansion in 2004 and 2007 different from many of the other expansions of the U over the years this was the largest in terms of absolute number of can trees and it was too poor a set of countries when Spain and Portugal joined they were also comparatively poorer than the rest of the EU but the Eastern European countries were far poorer and they were far more numerous so the wage gap and thus the incentive to migrate may have been larger so what we do in this paper is to look at UK vultures in four European Parliament elections ninety nine two thousand four three expansion and two thousand nine fourteen post expansion now you see another of these funny turned pictures which shows you our main treatment variable what we do in this map areas that received more migrants from Eastern Europe relative to the existing stock of EU microns so we are playing with this idea that areas that already have a lot of you migrants are used to them whereas areas that had few might from so far are more likely to find an influx of migrants art and threatening and whatever yeah so we take this ratio as a treatment but we can use alternative measures and things go through so it turns out that the migration was largest into areas with low qualification so when we start if you thought to use this typical labor economics style shift share instrument so using existing stocks of Eastern Europeans as a predictor of where new Eastern Europeans go but that doesn't work because the only Eastern Europeans that were there were either people who were soldiers out of a post World War two army regiments or it was high-skilled people who came after the iron curtain fell so that instrument just didn't work anyway so we do matching and stuff like that so let me just highlight the main result in terms of you could vote results what we find is that in a difference-in-differences framework in areas that received a larger migration flow after 2004 you could vote chess increase overtime buy more but I would like to highlight the size just in words in a median local authority district and the UK vulture went up by 1.7 percent in this post period 1.7 percent not percentage points so it's really a tiny increase statistically significant but numerically small also what we do in the paper is look at various channels so we ask is it true that there is an impact on wages at different parts of distribution it was a little bit at the lower end of the wage distribution is there an impact on the demand for services on a demand for benefits on housing markets is that right cetera and here and there we do find some effect statistically significant but typically numerically very small from which we summarize that there is somewhat of a disconnect between the salience of migration as a topic in the public debate and the actual stuff happening on the ground but obviously what could well be the case but would need more researchers that people in errors with little migration are worried about the migration going elsewhere that might ultimately end up their way so then it may be disconnected to what's happening on the ground so I should stop I think if you have questions you can email me [Applause] thank you very much for the perfect timing Sasha so Louie like we saw is next so thank you very much and I think it is a very timely session right and we know why so the result because populists was popular in Argentina in the previous century but because you know it got here the question are they going to to address in the paper joint with maximum really radio surveillance on which we are still working instead of depending on the British case we are sort of taking a much broader view because we are seeing that you know the phenomenon is sort of global and I think that is the source of the worry so the question is why now and why here in the Western countries and we have another table that tries to address these two questions jointly and essentially the story is that the economic crisis that we are facing in Western countries is a typical result you know a standard business cycle or type of doctor both in terms of length in terms of scope and in terms of magnitude there has been massive job displacement partly due to you know exposure to globalization and trade there has been mass migration that Sasha has been just documenting particularly within Europe but also from outside and desires to somehow you know generated a spread of deep insecurity in the population so economic insecurity is going to be the focus of these of this paper and the sauce I think of that we are trying to pull show the the main explanation for why we see the rise of the idea is that there's been a failure of usual measures to address the crisis you know these dimensions in the sense that both traditional responses either on the left side like you know government oriented policies or on the right side like you know more market-driven type of interventions I've proved unsatisfactory to some extent that is led you know to economic insecurity that has created demand for protection and voters disappointment with traditional politics as resulted in dissatisfaction with traditional parties and institutions and has opened up as create a scope for anti elite part is that offer so to speak cheap short term protection so in order to pin down and understand what is going on the idea is that when it's both a story of demand and it needs to understand demand which is that most of the focus of such a paper in the case of the Ucayali so the first paper but you need also to understand supply you thought the driver so the fact that you know populist parties propolis platform becomes appealing it became successful and so what we do we try to you know to understand both both Margie's saying it to give you a sense of the story that you're trying to do tell let me focus on internal party because my country so I know it later but it extends to to the rest of the European countries I think so if you look at the data in 2008 there's been you know we know a deep recession with with a dramatic drop in GDP and industrial production so another production fell by something like 30 percentage points and since then there has been no recovery in parallel to the fall industrial production there has been a dramatic drop in confidence in political parties you know the share of trust in political parties or something like you know 25 percent in 2008 you may say you know it's not great political parties and ever popular anywhere but it has dropped to something like four to five percent in the last few years and at the same time people started you know dropping from elections and an attending election so a drop in in turnout so what happens that the five star movement which typically populist movement which was not existent in terms in 2009 stepped in and after a while it gained a lot insane so since today is is predicted to be the first party in Italy the same story applies to Greece you see a similar picture in Spain and you see you see similar dynamics in in France so what they do in the paper is to try to put these features all together and build the story of you know the rise in supply of populist and why does become appealing for the for the vote so what I'm going to do is to you know to talk a little bit about first of all one needs to be appointed the definition of all people is populist means try to bring some evidence on the drivers of voting behavior playing and stressing the important role of the effects on know on turnout talk a little bit about the turning of supply and look at the responses of the other political parties if this time I will touch a little bit about deep effects of rhetoric which may have to you know to sort of give some answer to the question that satchels asking about you know why we see this reaction to to immigration but not to the actual immigration path test but to the beliefs about immigration and then how we go back to the big picture and perhaps discuss or it would be the implications and there is a couple of questions so the values for 40s for this paper is draws on two main data sources the European Social Survey which has mostly data on participation in elections and political party choice and the second one is the Chaplin expert service that as the date on part is manifestos position on issues orientation and so on that is useful when you look at and you want to model supply so what is a populism there is no clear definition there is probably disagreement the notion is back and difficult to pin down so when you don't know something about what is this or you do you resort to a dictionary so if you look at the Encyclopedia Britannica as a sort of neutral way or getting a definition the features that the secret via Britannica stresses is essentially a three-dimensional love characteristic of populist the first one is rhetoric the fact that publish party claim to promote people's interest and they are anti elite that is the first pillar of our popular species the second one is protection all law populist parties tend to offer protection in different source can be you know left oriented type of protection could be right oriented type of protection that pertains to pounders to people's fears and the third an important dimension is the fact that they tend to play down in their platform the long-term consequences of the short term policies that they offer so there is some degree of concealing in the policies that they advertise now one needs to measure these features and what we do we rely on a classification that is being promoted by Ivan Castle is a political scientist it is mostly based on the first dimension on rethoric and the reason is that that is easy to observe just look at manifestos and look at speeches and in particular I recommend that you read the bill through the trampling Agora speech that is a clearly populist manifesto so is evidence that allows classification secondly you know it covers all parties and it is a time-varying but you know the second one that relies on the three pillars is conceptually more appealing so to it all they do is to use the this trance service in order to get a clue of these three pillars and what we get is the following that if we build a measure of the three the three dimensions is the concealing hide in the protection measure the rhetoric measure and then combine them in a principal component a measure of three dimensions index of populism and then run a regression of each of these dimensions and the principal component on the castle measure what we find is that populist parties according to the castle they tend to score higher in terms of rhetoric in terms of protection in terms of hiding and overall in terms of the three D major populace so you know the difference between a populist party according to Bacchus and classification and standard party in terms of the three dimension major population ninety percent higher score economic insecurity and the drivers of poverty so I move into the second second topic what we find is that economic insecurity drives people's behavior along two dimensions and in important different ways first of all economic insecurity pulls people out of the political market that is they tend to stop participating in elections this is the negative effect that you see here or here when we use the 3d dimension and we use the bacchanal classification at the same time for those that you know go and vote economic insecurity increases the chances that people pick up a populist a populist part so it has a dual role it takes out people from the political the political market but condition on voting they tend to choose a populist a populist party secondly other two variables are key a much confidence people have in political parties more confident people tend to be more likely to vote and if they vote they are less likely to vote for a proposal for a populist party and third the sentiments to immigrants with opposite signs those with adverse sentiments worse immigrants they are less likely to vote but if they vote they tend to pick up a populist part in economic insecurity here is a measure of is a principal component measure that puts together unemployment experiencing and difficulties an exposure to globalization okay economic and security quantitatively is important because it has a direct effect what we stress in the paper that even more important is the fact that economic insecurity drives also people sentiments it has a causal effect we claim on trust in political parties in attitudes towards migration so when people feel more insecure they tend to distrust the politicians and political parties and institutions and they tend to for more advanced sentiments to us migration so if you put all things together the direct and indirect effect the indirect effect counts for something like almost half of the total effect of economic insecurity or not turn out and voting supply so there's been a sharp increase in the spread out over populist parties across countries and even in the number of populist parties within within each country what drives the you know the spread out to these parties is both out spread out is economic insecurity among voters so where more voters tend to feel economic insecurity it is more likely that the populist platform emerges secondly exposure to foreign competition and finally some measures of the quality of the institutional set up in the country and in this case you know the strength of checks and balances in the particular country where checks and balances are stronger this sort act as a sort of barrier to the emergence of the populous country secondly the orientation of of the party the definition that we are giving in terms of the three-dimensional definition that is independent of the orientation of the party both populist party Delina on the left or on the right they share the same the same features but populist parties they choose they are orientation if you look at Europe there is a high concentration of populist parties on the right we argue that what explains the choice of the orientation is a satiric decision and in particular where there is more disappointment there is you know if the ones that are more disappointed are the two inverters then a populist parties and the left even more disappointed that I doing voters they enter right and we find evidence that points in that direction reactions of traditional parties to populism what we find is that incumbent parties existing parties they tend to imitate populist platforms when they are successful that is in countries where the share of votes are crowing the populist parties goes up the distance in the platforms along different dimensions of the traditional parties and populist parties shrink and the reason is because it's not because the populist parties becoming sort of more astute institutionalize what is the reverse is because of the other parties are getting closer to the populist platform finally there is an important interesting question whether you know populist rhetoric matters to effect and the people people sentiments both you know Trust in part is an institution and perhaps how people will translate economic insecurity into these sentiments and we find that there is a both a direct effect of the presence of a populist party on people's sentiments to our institutions and to us immigrants that can rationalize the such point about you know the importance of people's immigrants and also we find that there is an amplification effect that is where there is a populist party people tend to to you know to translate the effect of economic insecurity tends to be magnified in terms of impact on trust in political parties in in in in terms of sentiments to us so we find evidence for both maybe there is a with some nice you know qualification that maybe we can discuss if there is interest on this dimension so the take ways are just to to repel is that this is a very unusual crisis is that is pervasive economic insecurity and there is failure along both the traditional left and the traditional right and this is what opens up the room for a three dimensional populist platform the main try that is economic and security is not culture per se there is no autonomous movement in in st. events but these sentiments are triggered are pushed by the economic economic forces in the reaction of you know the failure in the reaction to manage the crisis a couple of questions since you are asking them in 20 seconds so let me start with you know the big question whether you know populist will vanish my pressure is that given the nature of the crisis it is unlikely secondly I think it should carry what we are seeing should carry implications for the structure of the welfare system in the sense that our welfare system is designed to manage you know business cycles but it's not designed to manage the sort of crisis that we are observing so you know that cause I think a little bit of a tension of whether when whether we should and could reshape the structure of the welfare system and finally whether we should worry the fact of you are here I think the answer is obvious I think maybe you are dreaming here out of curiosity maybe out of worry so populist is a reaction to a political and economic crisis but you know the reaction can be much worse than the crisis itself this is difficult to prove but we can resort to history and give let me just give you an example that I just took from the beautiful book by William Goldman on the history of financial structure and the stories you know go back to a couple of thousand years BC in in the city of lagash in Mesopotamia there was this guy guru Kachina is probably the first populist guy in history we have sort of documented evidence and he promised to restore the power of ordinary people as much as Trump did in the u.s. today after a connect anomic collapse so he was able to overthrow or not the king and gain power and so he abolished all the tax collectors any cancel all the death Lagash was one the most developed cities of the time so people were relieved from debt obligations but credit disappeared altogether and that was the end of the economics axis of obligation okay so you'd stop here reducer okay so our our next speaker is on recipe ax okay now my my presentation actually follows very closely from what we just heard this is the study on which we have been working six of us Christian dustman Barry Eichengreen Bastian Orton myself cuídate Bellini and GILF is again the topic we have been working on is not exactly populist but closely related as we will see but we are working on trust and trust towards European institution but also towards national institutions and we really built on the work by Sasha and on the work by Luigi this study by the way will be released the day after tomorrow was meant to be released today but it will be on the Vox EU on the CPR website on on Wednesday so the studies is finished and so I'm just giving you some some of the results there are lots of lots of tables lots of regressions lots of graphs in the in the study obviously in 15 or 17 minutes I'm I'm only going to present a little taste of what of what we have done now as I said what we are after is really whether the EU is in trouble whether there is partly because of the crisis has there been a buildup of distrust towards Europe that one can fear for the future of of European integration in that sense sure brexit is part of the story is part of the motivation what has been happening in in Italian that Luigi talked about even though he talked you know more broadly but the Italian case is certainly very very symptomatic is obviously also one of the motivations of our of our study but we look at Western Europe we look at all of your but all of Western Europe essentially we don't look at the new member states except in in a little bit so you know we are after seeing whether there is a problem of trust in Europe what are what Heights causes and how does it relate to the issues of populism say we are really looking at trust but somewhere and I will show you some of the of the stuff that that we do we look to what extent populism and trust towards national institution to what European institution towards a new integration is related to populism and to populism as defined the way luigi's has just done it now we do believe that the EU is a particular strong target for populism if you look at you know back to the the definition of of populism and if you have sort of elite project of supranational transnational I mean this is almost the definition of the of the EU integration process so I think whenever there is a movement of populism it's not just something that one should fear at the national level I think one should a fear of what it does for the EU project that is the almost the first target for a populist discourse or action now what explained the rise of populism and we'll just saw in the in the presentation by by Luigi I mean there is this you know in the literature people discuss what it's the rise of economic insecurity or the rise of cultural insecurity but in a sense the two are very much related to one another and they relate to sort of among more fundamental factors like globalization like technological change like the financial crisis okay and they can sort of generate insecurity whether it's cultural or economic insecurity now the kind of data that we use is again not unrelated to what we we just heard we use two sets of data one is from the European Social Survey where we have data at the individual level and there it's for every two years from 2002 to 2014 we also use a European election database where there you have actual voting outcomes at the regional level for the European Parliament and this is for every European Parliament election from 99 to 2014 as I said we look we focus on on Western Europe and the dependent variable that that we use for the part from the European Social Survey sort of the individual level that we combine though with sort of regional data we look at attitudes trust towards EU integration and Trust towards national and EU Parliament and we also build a variable which is sort of the trust ratio the relative trust to what the European Parliament visa we trust by the same individuals towards national parliament we have also datum in individual level data on voting in national elections and from the European election database there we have regional level data on voting scores for Pro and anti EU parties in the manner that Luigi explained from the from the chest from the Chapel Hill expert survey so the classification of of parties now we first do something which is sort of to look at how populism and Trust are related and we do ask whether there is a correlation we don't talk about causation we ask whether there is a correlation between populism and trust in national and institutions and there it's voting and again it's sort of a demand and supply element because indeed we looked at populist parties definition based on Engel Artin and Norris in a paper for 2016 up everybody quote and a very interesting paper that looks at you know is it economic insecurity is it cultural insecurity and so we looked at voting for populist parties and what we find essentially is that whether you are looking at trust in national parliament with which is on the top left whether you look at trust in the European Parliament or whether you look at people's attitude towards Europe integration there is a strong correlation of all of those with voting for populist parties so clearly the trust issue and the populist issues they are closely intertwined with one another say we decided to focus on the trust issue but by doing that obviously we are very much aware that if you are losing trust this is certainly a factor that promotes populism so then you know focusing on on trust we sort of first sort of describing has trust in national and institutions declined over the entire period that we are looking at and the finding is that yes there is been a decline but somewhat at the end of the pier that is during the time of the crisis in 2012 and 2014 remember that the data to it that we have there's for for the attitudes the Trust is every two years from 2002 to 2014 so yes in 2012 2014 you do see something happening but it's not uniform across countries there are huge variations and I'm not going to go into all the detail but for instance when you look at a trusted variable or trust ratio variable which is trashed towards the European Parliament visibly trust towards the national in some countries and you see it here towards national so so this is just the picture for one year then if you look at the evolution there is this split in Europe between the north and the south so there is more trust in European Parliament in the sense in countries with the crisis did have an impact on this then we also look at the voting and whether voting has turned in favor of anti-eu parties and there again there's a lot of variation although there is some kind of a trend on for the entire period that we have there from 1999 to 2014 on average across the countries and across the the period there's about 20% vote for the anti what is called here anti-eu parties but in 2014 that jumped again on average to 30% again with huge variation across countries now what is clear is that the UK here on these numbers but also actually on trust before the UK is always an outlier so wherever there is sort of low trust there's more of the low trust in the UK whenever there is voting for anti-eu parties there's more of that in the UK so if you were to put a UK dummy we don't do that but because we have in a variable for all the car but yeah the UK comes out but there is again difference between the southern countries and in the northern countries and even there are differences obviously and we focused quite a bit on that on on region because or or our studies is at the regional level it's not at the at the country level we sort of exploit the regional variation now how is the the the vote this is the vote chair received by anti-eu parties how it has changed across there's just no pattern that is so there is an average something but within this average behind this average they're huge differences across regions across countries then we do look at the determinant of this what are the determinants of trust and voting patterns is it economic insecurity is it cultural insecurity so we look at regional economic shocks so what is regional unemployment how is growth of GDP per capita evolved at at the regional level and we also look at regional cultural identity so we extract from the survey data and from the responses some variable authoritarian and a liberal variable and then we have individual level data on age gender education where people live in etc now what is it that we find well we find first what everybody finds is that older and low educated people have generally lower trust towards both national and European Parliament and also less are less positive towards European integration this is true for all countries even though attitude levels are different but everywhere you find that those groups the older and the low educated less trustworthy of institutions and integration and again the UK is a not like because it's much more than then you find then you find elsewhere then we look at the the macroeconomic shocks controlling for age and education and a bunch of other variables we do find that negative shocks negative macro shocks negative macro shocks negatively impact Trusts both in European Parliament and national parliaments or both in national institutions and a European institution but the size of the impact on national institutions is twice the size of the shotgun European so when there is a macro shock in a sense people are more angry at the national institutions than they are angry at the European institution or they assign more responsibilities at the national level than at the European level and the sense then you find that the trust the trust ratio improves in favor of the European institutions as a result of that when you looked at the voting result there is a negative the negative macro shot negatively impacts on voting for pro European parties so pro European parties suffer from in European election from a negative shock and anti-eu parties do do benefit in a sense from that then we did look at a specific crisis effect sort of after 2007 so is there something beyond the macro shock 2007 crisis and what followed was a macro shock but was there also something the way let's say the way EU poorly handled the the crisis is there something specific and we do not find very much there is a small crisis effect but much less than we had expected it's a small quantitatively a small effects then we interact the macro shocks with cultural traits we do that at the at the regional level and we do find that indeed in regions where there is authoritarian culture in those regions there is amplification of the effects of the of the macro shocks in the regions where there is a liberal culture that dominates it's the opposite you have a macro shock and the macro shock is being dampened on its effect on trust by the liberal by the liberal culture on the other hand what we find about trust we don't find that for voting results there is no significant impact of cultural traits sort of more liberal or more authoritarian interacting with the macros um on the on the voting at the European Parliament so conclusion of all of this first one would say well there is grant for measured optimism trust in the European Parliament the National Parliament voting for pro-european parties they have not fallen dramatically in the crisis they have fallen but it's not been dramatic and you know the crisis does not seem to have really questioned fundamentally the trust that individuals have towards the national parliament or towards the European institution so we say you know let's be not too optimistic there is no existential crisis here the UK is special that's what we find regression or you know graphs after graph we find that the UK is special and that one cannot sort of go from what has happened the UK with breaks it to two other countries and on top of that there is no improved economic and political can condition someone can say you know let's be optimistic and look at the result of the election in France in in Netherlands there's grounds for optimism however we feel that there is also grants for for caution that indeed and that was shown before that some of the fundamental factors that are behind brexit they are also present in in other countries so when you look deep down at the characteristics of those individuals that have low trust towards European institutions even towards national institutions you find that you know you find that not only in the UK you find that in in other countries and yes you know the macroeconomic conditions that have become better but you know they could worsen in in the future so we feel that you know what should be careful we feel also that one should be careful because in a sense the EU is intrinsically fragile I think we do recognize that there is a question of legitimacy in the EU and the question of legitimacy is bought you know what political scientists call input legitimacy and output legitimacy input legitimacy is the question of the institutions and the the the participation of citizens in the European institution the capacity to influence the outcome of policy it's also the question of European demos okay fundamentally you know democracy is not the national level then at the European level so and that's very hard to improve one needs to improve obviously this input legitimacy but it's very very hard to do and therefore output legitimacy is in a sense more important at the European level than it is at the at the national level you know even with Trump even with brexit the UK is not going to disappear the u.s. is not going to disappear but a major shock that would happen about distrust towards Europe could have really a dismantled manner of Europe so we feel one has to be careful about legitimacy and first and foremost one is to work on the output legitimacy and that's my my last slide you know the –use priority need to be to regain output legitimacy now what is output legitimacy what is it that citizens are expecting that the EU delivers and sure we and you know in this study in like in all the other studies you know we concentrate in part on the economic matters and on the on the crisis and on the macro issues unemployment the growth effect but we very much believe and when you look at surveys at the EU level that they are also demand for non-economic issues I can not it's not just Economic Security sort of so non economic security that is demanded by by citizens yes one does need to address the the input legitimacy it's much more complicated but needs to be done if you look at the Rome declaration in March for the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome nineteen fifty 57 you know the heads of state of the 27 countries met there they signed a nice declaration or one two pages declaration when you read their declaration you see very much that European leaders are very much aware of the problems of legitimacy both input and output legitimacy and that the you need to do better in order to tackle the the in satisfaction of citizens and and some of the distrust that we have observed linked to link to populist so let me leave it there you know it's not just a question our next a speaker is P archaic you've got 17 minutes I can't move the mouse sorry it's a touch better thank you okay this means no I can see okay thank you okay so in I always said thank you very much for organic organizing this session on populism also for inviting us to present to make a plantation so actually this is a not presentation for research it's more about a book that has been carried on with unrest by Oberg which was in principle I same principle because the target wasn't truly completely reached at a large audience and it was entitled economically Allison and so it focuses on a particular aspect of realism which is what we call scientific Daniel ISM and scientific the nihilism is a dinner of knowledge which is established on a scientific basis meaning it's a lineal of kind of consensus knowledge which is recognized by people who belong to a to a special field of research and the book is is focused in a scientific journalism which is the applied to economists and we've written this book because where the feeling that at least in our country scientific delight the nihilism against economics is Israel Israel and actually the book has triggered many many very strong reactions about more than 200 papers in newspapers more than 90% of them being negative we get many supports by email from colleagues but very few in in the media and I think one of the reason why that it was really quite quite violent it has to do with populism and so what I want to do in this talk is to choose to to touch on four issues very rapidly about the nihilism economics and in other sciences the rhetoric of the nihilism that we already spoke about and then also the power of the nihilism why is it so powerful and I will try to to to to end with some policy recommendation that we could discuss to try to see what the EAA could you about improving what we do to try to fight against populism so what is about the nihilism in economics on in other sciences so when we started to work on this issue we were really surprised to see that the feeling we had respect to the public view and our profession was really shared by many other scientists in other fields and especially in medicines in biology also in physics because now they are I mean there are many debates related to the climate and all obviously in climatology and so there are many examples of very strong scientific denialism and i think that the the most the most interesting example is about the tobacco industry which has instilled duped about the awfulness tobacco for else and these this industry have been prosecuted by 46 american states in the 80s and 90s and the i to pay at the end the prosecution about more than 200 billion euros to compensate for the impact of their action on the oni on the american budget and on the american public and so so this this event is very well at the commanded by a marvelous book by robert proctor which is sort of all Proctor is an historian in stanford i guess and so this book is really nice about the view how people how a lobby can try to elaborate strategy about scientific denialism so you have many other examples of you see the correct creationists people were doing kind of scientific ninja listen against in medicine i just read out some examples on the slides and obviously on climates when you look at what people work in in physics and climatology proteins there is a very very strong consensus and from many people from outside is not abused and this is to a large extent apparently due to a very very powerful discourses and very powerful strategy of very important lobbies so and in economics obviously we think that it's a field which is most confronted with the within our ISM and I think there are at least two reasons first in economics the financial stakes are very very important and also people feel feel really a concern with most of the topic we deal with and so they are very present in the media and and so there are many ways to try to convince people that what a field is doing does not make any sense and so what we IDE we have now is that obviously there are many debates about the status of our discipline abroad economics is it a science or not I guess that most of you think that we do science but it's not something that is not spread in all the population I can tell you and so what we try to push we try to push the idea there and what contains that is it's a true idea that now economics is not that different from many other experiments or Sciences and one of the reason is that we have as you know more and more access to huge databases there have been I think a transformation of the way we did with data with causality issues I don't need to speak so much about that here but so meaning that we can reach on some issues some degree of consensus which is really which really relies on facts obviously knowledge is always uncertain I mean in all fields and it is the reason why we do research I mean we all will always want to doubt and to try to to improve it what we can know and this is obviously true in economics even if we have huge data set now but however I want to I mean we want to try that there are claims that are clearly wrong according to the consensus of the discipline so for instance respect to medicine is when you say there is no clear evidence that smoking is not often true for for else we know all of us now that this is not true I mean and that for years and years I mean there was a really strong doubt about that and in the realm of economics this idea that finance is useless the only way to reduce unemployment is to reduce rocking time to share jobs I mean we can increasing public expenditure is the only way to foster gross or emigration always goes unemployment we know I mean these are i mean i think concerns used to say that I mean this claim are not are not true and and so from this point of view I mean we are able to reach on some issues some consensus and so why is it so difficult to convince people that that that we we are we have no consensus and so I think it's it's because this I mean there is a restroom rhetoric of edenia lism which is very very powerful and very convincing so in the book we describe the need any elastic theory rhetoric of many lobbyists yo journalists ants is why we are so many so many negative negative reactions I think also some of our colleagues we belong to strong political I mean two political parties or two association with strong political orientations and so the way these people try to to spread Dobbs relies on four main arguments which are found in all all disciplines this is what is really fascinating first I mean the main strategy is to try to sow doubt and to denounce what they call the unique sort I mean we all share I mean if there is consensus the best way to try to destroy the constants is to say there is a unique thought and the unique thought is always very bad I mean it's not fancy to have a unique thought to think all in the same way and so this is the idea that the I mean the the business of these people who do lobby is to spread up and doubt their business and so there are also more I mean proactive strategy which is like promoted alternative scientific or scholarly associations the third pillar is to denounce mercantile or ideology identical interests as you know all mainstream economists are accused of excessive deregulation which is obviously always will by International Finance four people criticized in some discipline and also there is something which is also report for another argument is powerful which is to condemn science because it does not explain everything as we know we can't not we cannot explain everything no science can explain everything but I mean the the leading example here is about the crisis I mean most economics did not did not first is the financial crisis of 2008 yes and we are icing unable to frost you the next state of the or the financial crisis like I mean if your your your in may seen people are unable to say when we are going to get a concert if once we are going to get it but it doesn't mean that it's not it's not a science or is not to produce knowledge and so this kind of strategy are very very powerful because we are all all of us wait on my scientific journalism when we step outside our field of expertise because we are very strong I mean we are all threatened by by cognitive dissonance as you know so there are two main I think two main to main threats here first the confirmation bias we want to we want to find things that confirm our our priors and also what is called the identity protective cognition which is a way to say that you want to have some loyalty to your cultural group don't you want to find you want to find facts that corresponds to what what what is pride in the in the cultural group I'm going to give two examples about that and so there is no empirical evidence showing that culture is collectively prior to facts in the sense that individual said selectively credit and dismiss factual claims so any manual that we research or their preference the peripheral vision of the world of the good Society and so that been some fascinating work about that done by Dan kahan with a lawyer and psychologist at Yale University and so I don't I'll just tell you what is on these graphs on the horizontal axis you have the CSIs survey you have the survey about what people were asked questions about their their competency in in silence so you have some people some questions about acknowledging silence and so this is increasing with the degree of competence in silence and on the vertical axis you have the probability to to answer correctly to the question according to the theory of evolution human beings as we know them developed from earlier species of animals so this is a question on silence the knowledge of thailand's and so obviously you see a positive curve I mean people have more competence in science know more often that according to the theory of evolution human beings develop from earlier spaces and here you see that on the right hand side graph you have the degree of different graph different curve for the degree according to the great productivity of people so in in in yellow you have people who have above-average religiosity and in blue you have people below average so you find a positive also relation for the two type of people but now if you ask the question differently if you ask according to your to your prior to the same people human being as you know them develop from Aerospace's of animals so what you see that people who have a high level of validity when they have a higher level of scientific competence then they disagree with this claim often even if they know that the field as I've shown in the previous graph even if they know that the field according to the to the field to science I mean this claim this claim is true and so why is it so it's because 50 these people feel more comfortable to criticize the I mean the scientific consensus and so and also they want you they want to feel more comfortable to criticize the scientific consensus to be in line with the the main prior of all the other group so so you see and these people are us obviously I mean to LA this is service so this is a representative survey of people and they're so meaning that scientific nihilism is is is really is really can be very strong people because we are very very strong cognitive dissonance in in many in many situations so what what should we do knowing that we and all people a very strong cognitive dissonance I see that we have to fulfill some kind of a principle to be not to be misused and you think about these principles to elaborate some strategy which could be which could help our profession to spread I mean kind of conscious of scientific consensus so the principle way to fulfill that not to be misused I think yeah first to look for the scientific consensus of the field and whether it exists this is not always easy because most of the field do not provide tools to find this currency scientific consensus and also we are ready to be aware that I mean if you have the result that to appear for the first time in you know in a book in a large audience book or I mean which contradicts the kind of scientific consensus I mean yes really no reliability I mean finding and so four people are there is obviously the issue of conflict of interests and so conflict of interest will well beyond I mean financial stakes researchers we are engaging in political or associative life are likely to make judgments that reflect their commitments to their group much more than their scientific consensus so we also have to be aware of that and try to do to fight again this kind of of attitudes and so from from this what can we get in terms of policy recommendations could be relevant for our association European Economic Association I Institute to to deal with this issue I use what we have done is not rare but also and has been a situational insurance on civil have written a recent recent report for the Considine is economic I think it's going to be translated in English so it's going to be available for more if you but where they try to give some I mean some some recommendation to improve in France the I mean the the communication of the economists and so first kind of thing that we could do is to me to continue to disseminate good practice within economics scientific profession and so we do that when we publish papers in the journal of the European economy I can make a sissy Association we have to do to give some declaration of interest we could try to spread it more I mean to all member of the to provide their declaration of interest it will provide more confidence to wait wait what we do something I think which would be very very important it would be to develop an advertiser planner of economic experts which we interviewed on practical economic issues or economic policy actually we are my surface are not to worry about that but this kind of policy experts exist of and there is a there is one organized by the University of Chicago and and there is a panel of European experts and so the idea that there asks some questions like I to a low frequency well not twice a month and they have to answer and they can answer to if they want and so they give a ranking the egg is a position on a 0 to 10 scale in terms of the answer to the question but also in terms of the degree of confidence let's back to the questions and to the answer and so this is a way to know whether the consensus or not and just to finish I mean the to to to last recommendation publisher upgrade regularly a list of researchers who put intervening period debate but making sure that these researchers the good feel of competence and no conflict of interests and also organize close session of training of researchers and journalists on metro economic things ok change thank you all right so we have about ten minutes for question and answers what I suggest we do is that I collect we collect about four three or four questions out of the room and so that to get reactions I'd like people to raise their hands if they want to ask questions and I'd like to ask you to be breathed with asking your questions so there's a question here first can you can you stand up and speak yeah other questions no so then maybe I let Luigi respond to the first question you seem to be the natural so in a systematic way the other part is tend to adapt to the platform's all the suspects populace parties when populace gain a larger share of votes what we find is that the positioning of the other parties gets closer to the position of the populist party and this is across all issues we look at like you know position to the you you integration ideology and single political matters like no government intervention redistribution taxation and we document that this is because it's not because you know the populist party once becomes a sex or in terms of what share becomes more sort of responsible I guess because the others tend to imitate the populist party now this is interesting in terms of you know overall supply of published proposed abuse is saying that when a populist party becomes a sex route that is going to have a multiplier effect because it's going to condition and I thank the strategies there is also more sort of casual evidence for instance in Italy you know Renzi was the Prime Minister when was it two or three years ago and both in terms of action and in terms of symbols he was in order to try to counteract in sacral bit of the consensus all the rising Pfizer movement it was becoming a little bit populist so you know it started promoting transfers to the relatively low income individuals that was a sort of populist oriented policy most importantly was acting on symbols as well you know like avoiding displaying both the Italian the European flag in public in public speeches and so was trying to you know to move into the direction of the entire European type of populist platforms so the impression is that so far the success of published party is triggering imitation of the yeah so I think only wanted to yeah I just wanted to add two things to this one is that in in or study I'm in a sense we don't use the term as as you did you know supply and demand but I think this is a very very useful approach is it demand supply of populism on and as we did like you you know look at this data the chest data and look at platforms know what we do not see except for Italy and Italy there is an outlier we do not see a trend again up to 2014 we don't see a trend of innocence infection you know from one party there's more and more sort of populism in Italy you do see that platform sort of the supply of populism has increased in 2014 certainly so that's one factor so you know I want to caution a little bit that you know maybe the Italian example hopefully is not spreading to other countries the other question is I mean what will be very interesting for all of those studies that we have been talking about this the 2019 elections I mean we are going to have European elections European election in 2019 so I think it will be an opportunity to test some of the results that all of us have found you know what is your prediction for the 2019 election based on the different variables that we have and what's going to be the outcome of those populist parties thank you so for the second question Pierre is a natural person to respond although I'd like to hear so there's been so much trauma in the UK about brexit and the role of experts so that will give you a word also afterwards right yeah okay so you're right I mean it's difficult to intervene in the public debates and I think some that people who are doing research already and very actively you have no time to do it and that metric reasons and I agree with you there is a program of free world but on the other and is very difficult to organize and I think this is one of the ways wrong way we should try to do something for instance in the one of the proposal if if you have some panel of experts and we need to have a label okay and that's it to be able to avoid these kind of interventions because people intervene in the public debate for many different reasons you have some economies to do that for ideological reasons it's not want to agree world and so I think we need to to organize these and one of the way to do that is could it could be to have a kind of panel of experts it will be good to be on this panel it could be rewarded and the activity on this panel will be rewarded but we can also think of other things that would be organized to have a way to give to have a link between what is done in research and what goes to the media and so this is one of the proposal but it could be many other proposals I think yeah I think it's it's right what passes that there is not necessarily incentives for all of us academics to go to the media but also those who have done so especially with topics like praxis you may be subject to hate mails and accusations on social media you may get letters in the mail and stuff like that and I think some people just don't want to have that and rather prefer their ivory tower just because of this emotional stress not because of being challenged on content crowns but just because there is some hate around for certain topics alright so technically we have two minutes more so we could take one another question if there's a pressing question okay we I mean we we are we are bit short on proposals I mean we the the report that is coming out is really a report that analyzes the issues and and we do at the end sort of make broad proposals like the ones that I have described I mean we did not get into the specifics about what to do but I mean it's very clear for instance when you look at again sort of those Europe barometers you know those surveys of citizens and you see what is it that citizens complain about you know what is the EU not doing well and what is it that you wish you do see that there's a lot of non-economic stuff out there there is economic stuff and one of the typical things about unemployment or sort of you know social justice but there's a lot of non-economic matters like defense for instance so that is that is clear I mean if it's a clear element that comes out and you know people have been exposed to all kinds of events not just the economic crisis they've been other crises in Europe of which non-economic elements I think are playing a big big role right so so it's time to finish thank you very much all of you for your and

2 thoughts on “Causes and Consequences of Populism Session

  1. I can't even be bothered to listen anymore – the amount of time-wasting and hand-waving – just mash them into fertiliser already.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *